ΠΛATΩNOΣ ΠOΛITEIA Z' - Plato's Republic Book VII

Zeta

Sōkratēs
"After these," spake I, "compare -- by means of the following experiment -- our nature in respect to education and lack of education: for lo! see men in an underground dwelling, a cave; and stretching forth towards the light is an entrance having a long length along all of the cave; and in this cave have these men been since childhood in bonds about their legs and necks so that they remain there and they forward only look; and their heads because of the bonds they are unable to draw round; and the light of a fire coming up and burning at a distance behind; and lying between the fire and the bondsmen higher up is a path, along which a low wall has been built across, just as it is with puppet-shows when in front of the puppeteers lies a screen over which the puppets these performers display."

Eerie - it's almost as though Plato predicted television.
Just remember: "There is no spoon." - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAXtO5dMqEI

Glaukōn
"I picture it," saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"Now behold: along this wall are people carrying things of all sorts above the wall, humanlike statues, but also of animals -- these are of stone and wood and of all sorts of materials constructed; and it is reasonable that some of these bearers are making sounds, while others are silent.

Glaukōn
"Strange," saieth he, "is this scene thou saiest -- and strange bondsmen as well!"

Sōkratēs
"They are like unto us, " spake I. "For firstly, concerning such men, dost thou think that they have seen anything of themselves or of anyone else apart from the shadows which by the fire unto the opposite cave wall from them have been cast?"

Glaukōn
"For how," saieth he, "if unmoved they were compelled to keep their heads throughout their lives?"

Sōkratēs
"And what of these objects being borne? Are these not the same?"

Glaukōn
"Surely."

Sōkratēs
"And so if to speak amongst themselves they might possibly be able, dost thou not suppose that these very shadows which they were seeing they would think that the things themselves the shadows were?"

Glaukōn
"It must be so."

Sōkratēs
"And what if also an echo their prison had -- coming straight from the wall opposite? Whenever one of the bearers might utter a sound, dost thou think that the bondsmen would suppose the sound to be anything else than the passing shadow?

Glaukōn
"Yea by Zeus, I suppose not!" saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"Indeed -- in every way," spake I, "would then these bondsmen not think that the truth is anything else than the shadows of the objects carried?"

Glaukōn
"It must be so, quite so," saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"Consider then," spake I, "their release and healing from their bonds and folly -- what might possibly be the outcome if in the course of nature this should happen to them in the following way: whenever one might be released and he be compelled all of a sudden to stand up and to turn about his head and to walk and towards the light to lift up his gaze -- and all the while all of these things he does, he feels pain, and because of the dazzling light be he unable to fully see those things which before their shadows he had seen. What, pray dost thou think, might he say if someone were to him say that what he had seen before was foolishness? And that now, more so and nearer to reality and more towards reality hath he turned and more right doth he see? Further yea also, in pointing out each of those  real objects to him, might he be compelled by asking questions to reject that which is said to be so? Dost thou not think that he might be at a loss and would consider the objects he saw before -- the shadows -- as more true than the objects he is shown now -- the real objects?"

Glaukōn
"Very much!" saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"And surely would he not towards the light itself be compelled to look and to feel pain in his eyes and to flee, turning back towards those objects which he is able to fully see, and knoweth he that these are more clear than the objects which were just pointed out?"

Glaukōn
"So it is," saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"And if," spake I, "thence someone might seize him by force up through the jagged and steep ascent, and not let him go until he might drag him into the light of the sun -- would he not be at pain and chafe at being dragged? And whenever to the light of the sun he doth eventually come, will full of its light be his eyes so that he be not able to see what we now call true?"

Glaukōn
"No, not really," saieth he. "Well, not all of a sudden!"

Sōkratēs
"A need for familiarization, then? Habitualization, I think it would be, if he were intent to look upwards. So, first the shadows the most easily he would full see, and after this into the waters he would see the reflections of people and of other objects, and later the objects themselves. And from these experiences might he then the phenomena in the heavens and then the heavens themselves, and then by night more easily gaze upon, peering forth at the stars' and the moon's light than by day in the sun and in the sun's light."

Glaukōn
"Certainly -- how not?"

Sōkratēs
"Finally, I think that the real sun, and not the reflections in the waters, nor it in other, foreign media -- for these are illusions -- but then the thing itself as itself in its own medium he would be able to fully see -- and he would gaze upon what the object truly is."

Glaukōn
"It must needs be," saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"And after these, he would make sense of the sun, that it o'er the seasons holds sway, and o'er the passing of the year, and o'er all it surveys in the visible realm. And because of all these things which they had seen, the sun was in some way the reason of being for all things."

Glaukōn
"Clearly," saieth he, "that to such things he would come after realizing the rest."

Sōkratēs
"What then? Remembering his first dwelling and of the wisdom which was there and of his one-time fellow bondsmen, dost thou not think that he would think good fortune to be his change, and them he would pity?"

Glaukōn
"And how!"

Sōkratēs
"And of honors and rewards, what if some there were among them who between each other prizes to the quickest who fully sees the objects passing by, and to whomever remembers the best what the objects formerly were and what they were later accustomed to be, and how together they make their was across the wall? And because of these things, yea most able would it be for one to foretell what was to come -- dost it seem to thee that he would with single-minded pointedness possess those prizes and vie with those who are among the bondsmen being honored and ruling with power, or would he instead suffer like Homer and greatly wish that he,
'as a serf serve beside a man without land'?
Indeed, dost thou think he would suffer to opine with the bondsmen and to live that way?"

Glaukōn
"Thusly," saieth he, "what I think -- anything he would rather suffer than to live that way!" 

Sōkratēs
"And this consider further," spake I, "if such a one in going down should to his old seat fall, then would not full of shadows would his eyes be, he all-of-a-sudden withdrawn from the sun?"

Glaukōn
"Very much so!" saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"And yea, if it were necessary for him while discerning the shadows to vie earnestly with his bondsmen -- ever with his bondsmen -- while his sight was dim and before his eyes were settled, and then there would not be very little time for the familiarization -- and would not laughter he cause? And might he be then said because of his going up that he had utterly ruined his eyes and that in no way was it worthy for them to run the risk of going up? And should someone try to release them and lead them up -- well, if with their hands they could seize him and stay him, would they slay him?"

Glaukōn
"Certainly!" saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"Then this image, my dear Glaukōn," spake I, "must be applied to all that was said before: the place made manifest through sight is like unto the dwelling of this prison cell; the light of the fire within is like unto the power of the sun. And so, in comparing the ascent upward and the sight of those things aboveground with the soul's pathway upward to the intellectual realm, thou wouldst not err in thy hope, since of this thing thou art fore-hearted to hear. And some god knows if it happens to be true. And so these things to me seem to be thusly apparent -- that in knowledge The Idea of The Good is at the last and with difficulty seen. And, having seen The Idea of The Good, it is to be concluded that in respect to everything, it is the reason for the existence of all things proper and beautiful -- for in the Horatos Topos, the See-able Realm, The Idea of the Good gives birth to both the light and the source of this light; while in the Noetos Topos, the Intellectual Realm, it is the source itself, having both truth and reason. And it is necessary to see The Idea of the Good in order to with wisdom act, either in private or in public."

Glaukōn
"I agree," saieth he. "Well, as far as I am able."

Sōkratēs
"Come now!" spake I. "Agree on this and marvel not that those who to this height have come do not wish to in the affairs of men have dealings, but ever upwards urged on are their souls to busy themselves entirely. For this is likely so, if according to what we just said before, this holds true.


Glaukōn
"Likely indeed," saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"And what of this: dost thou think this to be astonishing if, say, someone from an embassage among the divine in returning to human affairs would be badly disgraced and would seem to be exceedingly laughable, for he is yet weak-sighted and not yet becoming suitably familiarized to the surrounding darkness? What of him being compelled in law-courts or some-elsewhere to contest with men about the shadows of Justice or the images which the shadows make, and to wrangle about Justice -- how ever shall such things be understood by those who have never before seen Justice?"

Glaukōn
"No, this in no way seem astonishing," saieth he.

Sōkratēs
"Ah, if Reason he hath," spake I, "then he would remember that the two extremes born from two causes are the confused states of our eyes;:that is, moving from light into darkness and from darkness in light. And once he hath realized that these same things happen to the Soul, then whenever he might see someone thrown in confusion and unable to see anything, then not without thinking would he laugh, but he would observe whether from a brighter life the Soul hath come and because of the unfamiliarity, it hath been blinded; or from more ignorance into a brighter place it hath come, and by a brighter flash of light the Soul hath been filled. And thus would he look favorably upon the one Soul in its experience and life, and on the Soul he would hath pity. If he should at the former Soul wish to laugh, then less absurd would be his laughter at it than at the Soul which from the light above it hath come down."

Glaukōn
"Very measuredly thou speak'st," saieth he.

Sōkratēs


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