SANCTI ANSELMI CUR DEUS HOMO - Why The God-Man? of St. Anselm

Here Beginneth Archbishop Anselm's Prooemium To His Book, CVR DEVS HOMO:

I have been compelled to complete the following work as much as it has been within my power to do so, but in a more hurried fashion than which it had been convenient for me and also, as a consequence of this, more concisely than I had wished, all of which owing to certain individuals who were copying its earliest drafts without my knowledge before the work had been completed and edited; had I been allowed to publish the thing in peace and in a timespan convenient for me, I would have worked in and included more topics on which I have been silent. This work began in England after being asked to do so; I was already in the midst of great distress of my heart, the nature and purpose of which thing I suffer God knows. I then finished it in Capua during my banishment. In accordance with the topics about which it concerns, I have titled it "CVR DEVS HOMO (Why The God-Man?)" and have split it into two brief books: the first of which contains the objections of non-believers who reject Christian belief because they think it in opposition to reason, as well as the answers of believers; throughout the work, Christ is kept at bay as if nothing had anything to do with Him, yet the work will prove by reasoned necessity that it is not possible for any human to be saved without Him. The second book will follow a similar structure in giving no thought or mention to Christ, but no less will it be demonstrated by employing plain reason and truth that human nature was designed for this purpose, that every person should enjoy blessed immortality in body and in soul; and additionally, it was necessary that this happen, this design for which humanity was made, but it could happen only through a God-Man, and only if everything which we believe about Christ were to happen. I earnestly request that anyone who wishes to copy this book include also this short prooemium at the start of the work, before the chapter headings; as result, in whosoever's hands the work should fall, said reader may have the whole thing before them and not miss anything.  

Chapters

Book I

1. The Question Upon Which The Entire Work Depends.
2. How The Things Which Must Be Said Are To Be Received.
3. The Objections Of Non-Believers And The Answers Of The Faithful
4. That These Answers Seem To Non-Believers To Be Without Necessity And Akin To Merely Pictures
5. That The Redemption of Humanity Was Not Possible Through Any Other Than The Person of God
6. How The Non-Believers Find Fault In Our Saying That God Hath Redeemed Us Through His Own Death And Thus Hath Shown Us His Own Love And Hath Come To Rout The Devil On Our Behalf
7. That The Devil Hath No Justice On His Side Against Humanity Though He Seemeth To Have Such, And Why God Could Have Freed Humanity In This Way
8. How, Although The Lowly Mannerism Which We Speak Of As Belonging To Christ Do Not Pertain To His Divine Nature, Yet It Seemeth To Non-Believers Improper That Such Be Spoken Of Him According To His Human Nature; And Why It Seemeth To Them That The Same Person Did Not Die Of His Own Accord
9. That He Died Of His Own Accord, And Why It Is That: 
1. "He Be Made Obedient Even Unto Death", And "Because Of This, God Raised Him Up" 
2. And "I Have Not Come To Do Mine Own Will"
3. And "His Own Son He Did Not Spare" 
4. And "Not As I Will It, But As Thou Dost"
10. Likewise Concerning The Same Topics: How They Can Be Properly Understood
11. What It Is To Sin And To Make Satisfaction For Sin
12. Whether By Mercy Alone Without Any Payment Of Debt Ought God To Forgive Sins
13. That Nothing Less Is To Be Endured In The Ordering Of The Universe With The Consequence That The Created Should Diminish The Honor Due To The Creator And Not Repay What Is Diminished
14. Of What Sort Be The Honor Of God Within The Punishment Of Sinners
15. If God Suffereth His Honor To Be In Any Way Violated
16. The Reason Why The Number Of Angels Who Fell Must Be Made Up Of Humankind
17. That New Angels Could Not Used To Make Up For The Fallen
18. Whether There Will Be More Holy Humans Than Wicked Angels
19. That Humankind Is Not Able To Be Saved Without Rendering Satisfaction For Sin
20. That Rendering Satisfaction Ought To Be Made In Accordance With The Measure Of Sin, But A Human Is Not Able To Render Said Satisfaction By Himself

I.1: The Question Upon Which The Entire Work Depends

Often and most enthusiastically have I been asked by many in both conversation and correspondence if I might set down in writing the arguments concerning a certain question about our faith, for these proofs I am accustomed to give as answers to questioners, for they say that these please them and they think them satisfactory. They seek this answer not so that they may gain faith through reason, but so that they may be gladdened by the understanding of and meditation on those tenets in which they already have faith; and furthermore, so that they may be ever ready (as much as they are able) to offer a satisfactory response to anyone asking them to give a proof concerning that which is inside us: hope. While non-believers are wont to object to this proof, deriding our Christian simplicity as foolish, believers also reflect on this question in their hearts: of course, I am speaking of by what reason or necessity did God become human and by His own death -- just as what we believe and confess -- did He restore life to the world, although He could have done so either using another individual, be they angel or even human, or by employing His own will alone. 

Not only the learned, but even many unlettered ask about this question, and both desire its proof; as such, many demand a discourse on this topic. Even though it may seem quite difficult at the outset, nevertheless its conclusion is readily understood by all and elegant in the usefulness and beauty of its reasoning. Even though the answer which ought to be satisfactory enough has already been stated by the Church Fathers, as far as God as seen it worthy to disclose to me, I shall take care to offer my own reasonings to those who still ask. 

Since proofs which through are debated through question and answer are better suited to many (and especially to slower) minds, and thus more gratifying, I shall then assign someone from the crowd of those debaters, a character who will harangue me more earnestly than anyone else on this point -- this person, Boso, shall put forth the questions, and I, Anselm, shall make answer in the following fashion. 

I.2: How The Things Which Must Be Said Are To Be Received

Boso: Just as the proper ordering demands: we ought to believe the deep mysteries of the Christian faith before we set about dissecting them with logic. There thus seemeth to me to be negligence if, after being confirmed in the faith, we do not enthusiastically attend to understand that which we believe. It is for this reason that, by the attendant grace of God, I fancy myself to grasp the faith of our redemption, for even if I were unable to understand by any reasoning that which I believe, there is yet nothing which might prevail in shaking me from my steadfastness on the matter. Still, I ask of thee -- and quite a few others are with me in my questioning -- that thou reveal to me what thou know'st as to why it was necessary and logical for God, even though He be omnipotent -- to assume the lowliness and weakness of human nature for its restoration?

Anselm: The question which thou ask'st me is above me, and for this reason I fear to discourse on topics too lofty for me, lest perchance someone may imagine or even see me as not giving a satisfactory answer and so will rather reckon that the truth of the thing is lacking merit when instead it is my understanding which is not enough to grasp it. 

Boso: Thou ought not to fear this question so much as thou ought to recall that oft doth it happen in conversing about some topic that God doth open what before was closed; and thou also ought to hope for the grace of God, because if thou dost graciously bestow that which thou hast freely grasped, thou shalt be worthy to grasp loftier topics than those which thou hast not yet grasped. 

Anselm: There is another matter on account of which I see there is either hardly or altogether no way for the question to be fully debated between us, and it is that this question requires a working knowledge of Power, of Necessity, of Will, and of certain other topics which exist in such a way that none of these can be fully considered without the others. For this reason, a discussion of these topics demands a work unto itself -- and, in my opinion, such an undertaking would not be a very easy digression, but it would not be entirely useless: for some ignorance of these topics makes them difficult, while they become easy if approached with some background knowledge.

Boso: Thou shalt be able to speak in brief concerning these topics in their proper place in such a way that we may have such information as needed at hand and whatever more is to be said on these matters we hold off for another time. 

Anselm: Ah, it is this also which causeth me to withdraw from answering thy question, for not only is the topic valuable, but likewise is it also of a form elegant beyond the sons of humankind, and just so is it also of a reasoning elegant beyond the understanding of humankind. For this reason I fear that to some degree I am wont to scorn those sickened artists whenever I see that our Lord Himself has been painted in base terms, that such would happen to me if I presume to expound on such a beautiful theme by employing inelegant and rude verbiage.

Boso: Nor ought this to deter thee, for just as thou allow'st one who is better at speaking to speak, thou forestall'st no one from writing more elegantly should thy verbiage displease them. But still, so that I may shut down all thine excuses at the outset, thou shalt do what I ask not for the learned, but for me and for those seeking its answer with me. 

Anselm: Since I see that the forwardness thou and thy companions show is coming from your asking this question out of charity and pious zeal, I will attempt to the extent of my ability and with the aid of God and with your prayers which ye have sent to me (yea, prayers seeking from me an answer while I was in the midst of searching for the very thing), to not only show the reasoning to thee, but rather to investigate the reasoning with thee -- this is the way in which I wish everything I say to be understood. Of course, if I should say anything which a greater authority doth not support -- even if I seem to prove it by reason -- with no other surety ought it to be understood except that my reasoning seemed good at the time, until such a time as God might better make it plain by some other means. But if I will be able to satisfy thy question to any degree, it will then be sure proof that someone even wiser than I shall be able to make it more plain; nay even more so: it must be known that, despite what a person can say or know, deeper answers to so great a question still lie hidden.

Boso: Allow me then to make use of the arguments of the non-believers. For it is fair that when we take up an investigation into a question concerning our faith, we use the objections of those who on no account want to enter into the selfsame faith without answers to their questions. Even so, it is for this reason that they seek answers -- because they do not believe; on the other hand, we seek answers because we do believe. Regardless, the answer which we are seeking is one and same. And if thou should make an answer to which holy authority seemeth to object, I am given license to hold up such an objection as correct until thou reply as to how the objection doth not hold up.

Anselm: Then say what seemeth to thee best to say.

I.3: The Objections Of Non-Believers And The Answers Of The Faithful

Boso: Non-believers who deride our simplicity raise objections to us that we do injury and insult to God when we affirm that He descended into the womb of the Virgin, He was born of a woman, He grew by milk and was nurtured with human nourishment, and, while I pass over many other characteristics which seemeth not meet for God, I will name the following: He endured weariness, hunger, thirst, lashings, and death on the cross amidst thieves.

Anselm: We do not God any injury or insult, but by giving Him thanks with our whole heart, we praise and we declare the indescribable depth of that mercy of His. For what is more amazing and beyond imagining is that He hath restored us, who are in debt from our so many and such great sins, to such and so great an unindebted good -- a good which we had already lost! -- therefore, by so much the greater love and devotion hath He shown towards us. For if they were to carefully take into account how conveniently the restoration of humanity might be taken care of in this way, they might not deride our simplicity, but they might join us in praising God's wise kindness. 

For it is necessary that just as through humanity's disobedience had death come upon the human race, so then thus through humanity's obedience might life be restored. 

And since sin, which was once the reason for our damnation, had its beginnings in a woman, just so ought the author of true justice and our salvation be born of a woman. 

And thus that the devil, who had conquered a man by persuading him to taste of a tree, should himself be conquered by a Man by inflicting on Him suffering on a tree. 

There are many other examples besides these, which, after close study and examination, exhibit a certain indescribable beauty in regards to our redemption if it was thusly taken care of in this way.

I.4: That These Answers Seem To Non-Believers To Be Without Necessity And Akin To Merely Pictures

Boso: All these examples are beautiful, but they are to be taken just as if they were some kind of pictures; for if there be not some solid foundation upon which these examples sit, then they seem not to non-believers to be enough as to why we ought to believe that God wished to endure what we say He did. For anyone who wants to make a picture chooseth some solid foundation upon which they may ply their art so that whatever the result of their efforts be, that result remaineth upon its solid foundation. For this reason no one maketh their art underwater or upon the winds of the air, for no traces of their art remain in such media. It is for this reason that when we offer these harmonious symmetries thou saiest to the non-believers as pictures of real events -- well, because they think them not real events as we believe them, but fictions, they believe us to be painting in the clouds. 

Therefore, the arguments for the solid foundation of this truth must be first demonstrated. In context of this argument, I mean "solid foundation" to be the necessity which proveth that God ought to have or even could have the ability to be brought low to suffer the things which we profess. Then, so that the whole argument itself may shine forth all the clearer as if it be the bodily form of Truth, those harmonious symmetries of thine, acting as if pictures of that body, must be explained.  

Anselm: Doth the reason as to why God should have done what we say not seemeth necessary enough? For the human race, a work of His obviously so precious, had entirely fallen, and it was not proper that what God had set forth concerning humanity ought be entirely wiped clean. Nor by the same token was His design able to be brought to completion unless the human race might be delivered by their very Creator?

I.5: That The Redemption of Humanity Was Not Possible Through Any Other Than The Person of God

Boso: If this very deliverance of which thou speak'st might be spoken of as having been carried out by whatever means thou willst but through some person other than the person of God, either angel or even, if it pleaseth thou, a human, then the human mind might be able to more readily accept such a premise. For it was within the power of God to make some human being without sin, not born from a sinful substance nor born from another human being, for it was in such a way He made Adam, and through such a being doth this selfsame work of deliverance seemeth to have been able to be accomplished.

Anselm: Dost thou not understand that if any other being might redeem a human from never-ending death, then that same human would rightly be judged to be subservient to that being? But if this were so, then humanity would in no way be restored to that honor which it was on the verge of possessing had it not sinned, because humanity, which was to serve only God and be equal to the good angels in every respect, would instead serve a being who is not God and whose angels were not His servants. 

I.6: How The Non-Believers Find Fault In Our Saying That God Hath Redeemed Us Through His Own Death And Thus Hath Shown Us His Own Love And Hath Come To Rout The Devil On Our Behalf

Boso: Ah, here is something they are quite amazed by: that we call this deliverance a "redemption", a "buying-back". They say to us, "in what prison, or in what cell, or in whose power were ye where God was not able to set ye free unless He bought ye back by such toils and, in the end, by His own blood?" 

And then we say to them that God hath redeemed us, "bought us back", from sin, and from His wrath, and from Hell, and from the power of the devil, whom He Himself came to rout for us, because we were not able to do so -- and so, he hath bought the Kingdom of Heaven back for us; since all of these things He did in this way, it doth show how much He cherisheth us.

Now, to this the non-believers may reply: "If ye say that God was not able to do these things merely at his command, the same God whom ye say created everything else by commanding it to be so, then ye contradict yourselves because ye make God powerless. Or if ye say that He was able, but did not want to do so unless in this way -- but then how are ye able to show that He is wise if ye insist that He wanted to suffer in such ways unbecoming of Him for no reason? For all these examples which ye bring up are in keeping with what He willeth: for example, the wrath of God is nothing other than His will to punish. And so, if He willeth not to punish the sins of humankind, then humankind is free from sin and from the wrath of God, and from Hell, and from the power of the devil, all which things humankind suffereth because of sin, and thus humankind taketh back what it lost because of that same sin. For under whose power is Hell? Or the devil? To whom doth the Kingdom of Heaven belong except to Him who made them all? In conclusion, whatever ye fear or desire, it all falleth under His will, which nothing is able to resist. It then follows that if He did not want to save the human race except by the way which ye say, although He could have done so by His will alone, then look how ye -- and I'm putting this mildly -- reject the wisdom of God! For if a human were to do by means of serious toil a task which they might have been able to perform easily, then they would not be deemed by anyone to be wise. Now, as to what ye say that this showeth how greatly God doth cherish ye, this is backed up by no sound reasoning unless it be demonstrated that He was able to save humankind in no other way -- for if He had been able to accomplish this in no other way, then perhaps it would, by necessity, show His deep love for us. But now, when He could have in some other way saved humankind, what then is the reason as to do and undergo the things which ye say He did for the sake of showing His love? For doth He not show as much love for good angels, but yet for them He doth not undergo such things? But as for ye saying that He hath come to rout the devil on your behalf -- in what frame of mind are ye that ye dare to make such a claim? Doth not the omnipotence of God rule everywhere? So how was God lacking a space where He had to come down from Heaven in order to defeat the devil?"

These seem to be the points which non-believers argue with us.

I.7: That The Devil Hath No Justice On His Side Against Humanity Though He Seemeth To Have Such, And Why God Could Have Freed Humanity In This Way

Boso: But as for that argument which we are wont to use, that God, in order save humankind, obviously ought to have treated with the devil first with justice before resorting to strength, so that when the devil slays Him in whom there was no reason to die and who was God, he justly loses the power he long had over sinners; otherwise God would have done unjust violence unto the devil, since the devil had just ownership over humankind, a servant he himself had not drawn into his thrall with violence, but the very selfsame human had willingly gone over to him. I just do not see the persuasion this argument has. 

For if the devil or a person belonged to any other than God or resided in some other's power than in the power of God, then one could rightly argue this. But since the devil or a person doth not belong to any but God and since neither existeth outside the power of God, then what reason hath God to treat with his own creation except to punish such a servant who had persuaded his fellow servant to desert their shared Lord and go over to him, a traitor who had brought an exile under his wing, like a thief welcomes another thief who makes off with their Lord's stolen property? For both were thieves -- the one stole himself from his Lord at the other's suggestion. For what could be more justly done if God should do this? Or if God, the judge of all, should snatch humanity, which hath been described thus far as beholden to another, from the power of the one who so unjustly holds it -- did He do so to punish humanity in some other way than through the devil's agency, or to spare humanity? What would be the injustice here? For although humanity ought to be justly tormented by the devil, yet the devil was unjustly tormenting humanity. Humanity had deserved to be punished and it was in no way more fitting that it be punished by the one to whom it had consented to sin. But the devil did not deserve to punish us -- nay, the devil acted much more unjustly in this regard, as he was drawn into it not due to a love of justice, but forced by malicious impulse. For the devil did not act thusly at God's command, but, due to His wisdom which we cannot understand, the devil acts with God's permission, as He creates order even out of evil. And I think that those who believe the devil to have some sort of justice for the ownership of humanity are thence influenced towards this line of thinking, for they see that humanity justly exposes itself to the torments of the devil and God justly allows it -- it is for this reason that they think the devil justly inflicts that torment. For one in the same thing can possibly be just and also unjust according to various points of view, and it is because of this that said thing is judged to be entirely just or entirely unjust by those who do not carefully observe the matter. For it happens, say, that one unjustly strikes an innocent person -- it follows that this offender justly deserves to be struck. Yet, though the one who was struck ought not to avenge themselves, but still they strike the one striking them, they then act unjustly. Therefore, this physical violence on the part of the one returning the blow is unjust, for they ought not to avenge themselves -- but as for the first offender who was struck in return, such an act was just, for the first offender who unjustly struck deserved to be struck justly. And so, depending on various points of view, both just and unjust could be used to describe the same action, for it could possibly be judged by one to be entirely just, and by another to be unjust. And so, it is in the way that the devil is said to justly torment humanity, for God justly allows it, and humanity justly endures it. But humanity is not said to endure that which humanity is justly said to endure because of humanity's own justice, but because humanity is punished by the just judgment of God. But if mentioned is that written decree which the Apostle describes as drawn up against us and through the death of Christ was destroyed; and if one thinks that the meaning intended by this decree is that the devil, acting as if under the writ of some sort of agreement in which he justly exacts sin -- and also the punishment corresponding to that sin! -- from humanity before the passion of Christ, and the sin he demands as if it were interest from that first sin which he persuaded humanity to commit -- the result of this is that it seemeth to prove that he hath some sort of justice over humanity, but I do not think it to be understood in this way at all. This is simply because that writ is not the devil's, for the writ is said to be decreed, and it was decreed not in the devil's name, but God's. For by the just judgment of God this had been decreed -- and as if confirmed by this writ! -- that humanity who had sinned of it's own accord, had the the power to be able to avoid neither sin nor the punishment according to that sin. For the spirit is leaving and not returning; and the one who sins is a slave to sin. The one who sins ought not to be let go without punishment, unless mercy spare the sinner and free them and lead them back. And so, according to this writ, we ought to believe that no justice belonging to the devil can be found in regards to his harassment of humanity. In conclusion, just as in a good angel there is no injustice in the slightest, just so in a wicked angel there can be no justice at all. Therefore, there was nothing in regard to the devil as to why God ought not to utilize His own might against the devil in order to free humanity. 

I.8: How, Although The Lowly Mannerism Which We Speak Of As Belonging To Christ Do Not Pertain To His Divine Nature, Yet It Seemeth To Non-Believers Improper That Such Be Spoken Of Him According To His Human Nature; And Why It Seemeth To Them That The Same Person Did Not Die Of His Own Accord

Anselm: The will of God ought to be enough of a reason for us -- for when He does something, it be not permitted for us to see why He willeth it. For the will of God is never irrational.

Boso: That is true if it is a given that God willeth something and it is carried out. For many people in no way agree with the notion that God does something if reason seemeth to oppose it. 

Anselm: What seemeth to thee opposing to reason when we say that God hath willed the things which we believe concerning His incarnation?

Boso: I say, to wit: the Most High stooping to such humility, that the Almighty does anything with such toil.

Anselm: Those who assert this do not understand what we believe. For we claim that the Divine Nature is, without a doubt, impassible -- that is, He cannot suffer injury -- nor can He be brought low in any way from His lofty seat, nor doth He toil in what He willeth to do. But we say that the Lord Jesus Christ, true God and true human, one person in two natures, and two natures in one person. For this reason, when we say that God suffers some humility or weakness, we do not understand this to apply to the loftiness of His impassible Nature, but to the weakness of the human substance He was wearing -- by this line of thinking, no reason known stands in the way of our faith. For in this way we mean to attach no debasement to the Divine Being, but we point out that a single person is of God and of humanity. Therefore, there is understood that no debasement of God due to His incarnation took place, but instead the nature of humanity is believe to have been exalted. 

Boso: It may be thus. Let nothing which is said about Christ in reference to any debasement be attributed to the Divine Nature. But yet, how will it be able to be proven just or reasonable that God thus abused that particular person, the one whom The Father called His own beloved Son in whom He was very pleased and whom The Son made himself, or allowed that person to be abused? Where is the justice in handing over that person, the most just of all, to death on behalf of the sinner? What person would not be judged as guilty if they were to find an innocent guilty in order to set free the guilty? So the question seemeth to lead to the same contradiction as stated above. For if in no other way was He able to save the sinners than by finding a just person guilty, where is His omnipotence? But yet, if He was able to do, but did not wish to do so, how shall we defend His wisdom or even his justice?

Anselm: God The Father did not, as thou seem'st to understand, abuse that person or hand an innocent over to death on behalf of a guilty person. For not did The Father compel someone unwilling towards death nor allow him to be slain, but He withstood death willingly so that He might save humanity.  

Boso: Even if He were not unwilling since He agreed to the will of The Father, it yet in a certain way seemeth that The Father compelled Him by His command. For it is said that Christ "humbled Himself, being made obedient to The Father even unto death, the death of the cross. On account of this, God hath lifted Him up"; and "He learned obedience from these which He suffered"; and that "not His own Son hath The Father spared, but for all us did He hand Him over". And likewise, The Son saieth: "Not have I come to do Mine own will, but the will of Him who sent Me." And yet again saieth He at His passion: "When a command My Father hath given to Me, I do it." And again, here: "This chalice, which The Father hath given to Me, shall I not drink of it?" And also: "Father, if it is possible, let pass from Me Thy chalice -- but yet, not as I will it, but as Thou dost." And again here: "Father, if it is not possible for this chalice to pass from Me without My drinking it, let Thy will be done." In these instances Christ seemeth to withstand death more because His obedience compelling Him instead of His own will guiding Him. 

I.9: That He Died Of His Own Accord, And Why It Is That: 

1. "He Be Made Obedient Even Unto Death, And Because Of This, God Raised Him Up" 
2. And "I Have Not Come To Do Mine Own Will"
3. And "His Own Son He Did Not Spare" 
4. And "Not As I Will It, But As Thou Dost"

Anselm: As it seemeth to me, thou dost not differentiate well between this which He did because His obedience exacted it from Him -- including what happened to Him -- because He maintained His obedience, not because His obedience demanded it of Him.

Boso: I must needs thee explain this further.

Anselm: Why did "the Jews" persecute Him even unto death?

Boso: For no other reason except that He unerringly kept to truth and justice in life and in word.

Anselm: Yes -- this is what I think God demands from every rational creature, and so each rational creature owes this to God.

Boso: We would be correct to state thus.

Anselm: Therefore, The Man owes this obedience to God the Father -- Human to Divine, and so this obedience the Father demanded of Him. 

Boso: No one could doubt this.

Anselm: Now thou hast it! That is how He did what He did with His obedience demanding it of Him. 

Boso: That is true. And now I see how He endured what was inflicted upon Him because He persevered in His obedience. For death was inflicted upon Him because He persisted in His obedience, and this death He endured. But how His obedience doth not demand this of Him, I do not understand.

Anselm: If humanity had never sinned, ought humanity then to suffer death, or ought God to demand this of humanity?

Boso: Just so, we believe that neither would humanity die nor would this obedience be demanded of humanity. But I want to hear the reason for this from thee.

Anselm: Dost thou deny that a rational creature hath been made just and for the purpose of becoming blessed in the enjoyment of God?

Boso: No.

Anselm: But wilst thou value it meet that the creature which He made just for that creature's blessed state of existence, He then cause to be wretched without the interference of sin? For it would be a wretched thing for a person unwilling to die to do so.

Boso: It is clear that if humanity had not sinned, God ought not to demand death from humanity.

Anselm: Therefore, God did not compel Christ to die, He in Whom there was no sin, but He Himself endured death of His own accord, not due to His obedience in giving up His life, but on account of his obedience in preserving the justice in which He so bravely persevered, so bravely that He thence met death. For it can be said that The Father ordained Him to die, since The Father ordained that because of humanity's sin, humanity shall meet death. And so thusly, "Just as the command The Father gave to Him, thus He did, and the chalice which The Father gave to Him, he drank; and He was made obedient to The Father even unto death." And thus "He learned obedience from the things which He suffered," that is, to what extent obedience ought to be maintained. But the word which is used here, "learned", can be understood in two ways: either "one learned" is used in place of some phrase like "one causes others to learn"; or "one learned" by first-hand experience something which one knew of beforehand but only through knowledge, so say, second-hand. This is the kind the Apostle speaks of when he said: "He humbled Himself, being made obedient to The Father even unto death, the death of the cross." Hereupon he added: "On account of this, God hath lifted Him up" and "He hath given to Him the name which is above every name", which is like unto what David said: "from the rushing stream in the way shall he drink, therefore shall he hold high up his head". Now, what was not said was that He was in no way able to arrive to His exaltation except through His obedience in His dying, and that His exaltation was not conferred upon Him as a recompense for His obedience -- for before His passion, He Himself said that all hath been handed to Him by The Father" and "all belongeth to The Father" -- but since He designed affairs such with The Father and with The Holy Spirit, He would in no other way than through His death show to the world the lofty heights of His omnipotence. Of course His exaltation hath not been designed to occur only upon the occurrence of His death -- but since it did, then it is not incorrectly stated that His exaltation happened because of His death. For if we intend to do something, but then declare that we should perform another task before the first task and by means of this second task the first task might be accomplished, and then, when we do so and we are ready to proceed, if the what we intend to do, the first task, is accomplished, then rightly it is said to have happened because of the second task, since when we performed that was the first task accomplished; however, it is not so that it this had all been designed so that in no other way than through the second task was the first to be accomplished. For if there is a river which I am able to cross either by horse or by, say, a boat, and then I declare that I would cross this river in no way other than by boat, and then I put off my crossing on account of there being no boat, then, when the boat arrives and I cross, rightly would it be said concerning my travels that "a boat was readied, and by means of such he crossed the river". We use such phrasing when we talk, not only as when something happens by means of the tool or action which we desired, but also when we decided to do something not by means of some tool or action, but only after the fact. For if someone puts off taking food because they have not yet attended the celebration of Mass that day, then when accomplished is that which they wished to do first, it would not be incorrect to say to them: "now take food, for thou hast done that for which thou wert putting off thy meal." Therefore, the language is much less unusual when Christ is said to be exalted for the very reason that He had withstood death, through which and after which He decreed to do His exaltation. It can be understood in the following way, that it is written that the Lord hath advanced in wisdom and in grace in the sight of God; but this was not so, but because He comported Himself as such, it was is if it were such. For if He was so exalted after His death, it would seem to be as if it were so on account of His death. As to this, He Himself saieth: "I have not come to do Mine own Will, but His Who hath sent Me," It is likewise when He saieth: "My teaching is not Mine own," for whosoever owneth no thing through their own power apart from God ought not to speak of owning anything themselves apart from God. But no one owneth by themselves the Truth which they teacheth, or likewise have a just will, except by the power of God. Not so did cometh Christ to do His own Will, but the Will of The Father. It was because the just will which He had was not from His human nature, but His divine nature. "But His own Son did not God spare, but for the sake of all of us He handed Him over," means nothing else other than He did not set Him free. For we find many instances in Sacred Scripture phrasing of this type, such when He saieth: "Father, if it is possible, let from me pass that chalice. But it is not as I will it, as Thou dost;" and likewise, "If it is not possible for this chalice to pass unless I drink from it, let Thy Will be done." When He saieth "His own will," He means the natural desire He hath for safety, for His human flesh was attempting to flee the pain of death. But when He saieth "the Will of The Father," not since the Father would have preferred the death of His Son instead of His life, but because The Father was unwilling for the human race to be restored unless humanity would do something as great as He did with His death. Because reason was not demanding that something which another was unable to do, then, for this reason, The Son saieth that He willeth His own death. Since He Himself preferred to suffer death rather than the human race would not be saved, as if He were saying: "Since Thou dost not will the reconciliation of the world in any way other than this, I say to Thee that in this way I will Mine own death. Let Thy Will be done, that is, let My death be done so that the world be reconciled to Thee." For often we say that someone wants something because they do not want something else, but if they want it, it would not be what they are said to want. It is like when we say that someone who does not want to close the window is someone who wants the candle to be blown out because the wind is blowing through the window and will put out the candle. Just like that The Father willed the death of The Son because in no other way did He will the world to be saved except by a human doing something so great -- this I have already said. It is because of this that it was a boon to The Son who willed the salvation of humankind, since no other than He could have gained from this boon, in exact proportion as He was ordered by the Father to die. Whence He, just as if The Father had given the command to Him, did so and the chalice which The Father gave to Him, He drank, being obedient up unto death.

I.10: Likewise Concerning The Same Topics: How They Can Be Properly Understood

Anselm: It can also be properly understood that through the holy will by which The Son wished to die for the salvation of the world, The Father gave to Him the command (but not by compelling Him) and the chalice of His passion and spared not The Son, but for us He handed over The Son and willed His death -- and so, The Son was obedient up to His death and learned obedience from the things which He suffered. This is just like how He did not possess the will of living justly according to His own human nature of His own accord -- for this came from The Father -- just so also was He unable to possess that selfsame will by which He willed to die so that He might do so great a good without it coming from the Father of lights, by whom every best thing hath been given and every gift made perfect and complete. And just as The Father is said to draw someone by bestowing a will to do so, it would thus not be incorrect if it were asserted that He compels them. For just as The Son saieth of The Father: "None cometh to Me unless The Father will hath drawn them." Thus can "unless The Father will have compelled them" be supplied instead. In suchlike way could The Son proclaim: "None layeth down their life because of My Name unless The Father will hath compelled or drawn them." But since each of us is by our will either drawn or compelled towards that which we unswervingly desire, it would not be wrong to say that God draws or compels one, since that is the nature of the will which He bestows. Now, in regards to The Father's drawing and compulsion, no necessity of violence is to be understood, but a voluntary and loving cling to this holy will which hath been bestowed upon us. And so, if it cannot be said that The Father did not draw or even compel The Son to death by bestowing His will upon Him, then who would not see by the same line of reasoning that the command The Father had bestowed upon The Son to withstand death voluntarily and drink of that chalice which He not unwillingly drank. And if The Son is correctly said to have not spared Himself but instead He handed over His very own person of His own accord and free will, then who would say that it would incorrect to state that The Father, by whom The Son possessed such a will as He did, did not spare The Son, but The Father handed over The Son for us and willed His death? And in this way The Son unswervingly and of His own accord in keeping to the will which He had received from The Father did become obedient unto death and He learned obedience from these things which He had suffered, that is, how a great action is to be done through obedience. For that is real and simple and pure obedience, when a rational-minded creation keeps its will which it received from God not out of necessity, but of its own accord. We can by other ways as well rightly understand that The Father wanted The Son's death, even though these I've named should be enough. It's just like when we say that someone wants something if they cause someone else to want it; and thus we say that someone wants something if they approve of someone else wanting it, even if the former did not cause the latter to want it. Or it is when we see someone wishing to bravely suffer trouble in order to accomplish some good deed; even though we'll admit that we want them to undergo that punishment, it is not yet the case that we want or love their punishment, but their wanting to do so. It is same with the case of the one who can prevent a thing, but takes no action to do so -- therefore, we are wont to say, they wanted to happen that which they took no action to prevent. And since the will of The Son pleased The Father, He did not keep The Son from wanting or from fulfilling what He wanted; it is correct to say, therefore, that The Father wanted The Son to withstand death so devotedly and so advantageously even though He loveth not His death. Moreover, The Son saieth that not could the chalice pass from Him without Him drinking of it, not because not could He avoid death if He wished it, but since, as it had been said, the world could not possibly be saved in any other way. And The Son Himself was unswervingly desirous to suffer death rather than the world not be saved. For this reason He saieth those words to teach the human race that in no other way could the world be saved except through His own death; it is not so, however, that He said that He had no power to avoid His death. For whatever is said about Him is similar to these examples which have already been mentioned and so have been explained with the conclusion that one believe it was not due to necessity, but of His own free will that He died. For He was all-powerful, and one can read concerning Him that since "He was offered up because He Himself wished it so." And He Himself saieth: "I put down Mine own Soul to take It up again; for none take Mine own Soul from Me, but I put down It by Mine own very hand. I hath the Power of putting down Mine own Soul and the Power of taking It up again." So, He Himself does this of His own Power and Will -- in no way can He be rightly said to be forced into this. 

Boso: But this, that God alloweth His Son to be treated in such a way, even if He be willing, is not seemly for such a Father in respect to such a Son.

Anselm: Nay, but very much proper for such a Father to agree with such a Son if the Son desired something worthy of the honor of God and useful to the salvation of Humanity, a thing which in no other way could be accomplished. 

Boso: We are still wrestling with the idea that His death is proven rational and necessary. If it were otherwise, neither is it seemly that The Son Himself ought to desire it, nor The Father to force Him or allow Him to do it. The question is, why was God not able by another way to save Humanity? Or if He were able, why did He want to do it in this way? For it seemeth ill-fitting for God to have saved Humanity in this way. Nor is it clear what The Son's death accomplishes in respect to Humanity's salvation. Indeed, it seemeth miraculous if God is so delighted by, or requires the blood of an innocent, such that He is neither desirous or able to spare the guilty unless said innocent be murdered.

Anselm: Since in this line of questioning thou hast adopted the character of one who wants to believe nothing apart from what has already been demonstrated true by sheer reason, I wish to make an agreement with thee: that in no way, not even in the slightest degree do we allow any debasement of God, nor is any rationale, even the smallest, thrown out, unless a greater rationale proveth it false. Just as it is impossible to ascribe any sort of debasement, however small, to God, thus any rationale, however small, is approved by necessity, if it be not o'ercome by a greater rationale. 

Boso: I accept nothing more freely in this line of questioning than his pact which hath been made between us. 

Anselm: So, the question only concerns the incarnation of God and those thing which we believe concerning His taking up Human nature?
Boso: Yes.

Anselm: Let us therefore propose that the incarnation of God that which we say concerning His Human nature never happened. Let it be agreed between us that Humanity was made for happiness, a kind of holiness which cannot be possessed in this life; further, no one can approach this blessed happiness unless their sins be forgiven, nor doth any human being go through this life without sinning; and let us include also everything else of which a belief in everlasting salvation is necessary.

Boso: Let it be so. Nothing seemeth in any of what thou hast said to be a debasement of or an impossibility for God. 

Anselm: It is therefore necessary for a person to be forgiven their sins if they are to come to that blessed happiness.

Boso: We all hold thus. 

I.11: What It Is To Sin And To Make Satisfaction For Sin

Anselm: And so, the question must be asked: by what rationale doth God forgive humanity their sins?