~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-THE CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED BY SERVIUS GALBA AGAINST THE REBELLION OF THE ALPINE GALLI LED BY THE SEDUNI-
[III.2] When several days of wintering had passed and Galba had bid the grain supply be brought thither, suddenly he is by scouts informed that from the part of the hamlet, which he had to the Galli given up, all the people had left during the night, and the mountains which hung overhead were by a very large number of Seduni and Veragri held. This deceit had because of several reasons occurred, with the result that all-of-a-sudden the Galli seized upon the design of renewing the war and overwhelming the legions: the first reason, because they looked down upon the small size of legion which was not at full strength with two of its cohorts withdrawn, and several others, who had been sent about for the sake of seeing to the supply lines, were absent. And then secondly, because of the unevenness of the terrain, they reckoned that when they charged down from the mountains into the valley and their weapons they hurled, not even their first attack could be withstood. In addition, they were aggrieved that their own children had from them been taken away under the name of hostages, and not only for the sake of marching, but also had they convinced themselves that the Romans were attempting to seize the peaks as never-ending possessions and were adding these environs to their neighboring Province.
[III.3] This news received, since neither the work of the winter-quarters nor of the fortifications had been fully completed, nor in regards to the grain supply or anything about the rest of the supply lines been satisfactorily planned, all because Galba, since surrender was made and hostages received, had reckoned nothing to be feared concerning war, he, once a council was quickly summoned, began to ask for opinions. In this council, since such a recent danger had befallen them and nearly all the higher ground could be clearly seen to be filled up with a great number of armed men, and neither could they be reached by aid, nor could the supply line be supported since the routes were closed off, their well-being was nearly despaired of and several opinions of this sort were offered: the result was that, with their baggage left behind and a breakout made, they might hasten to safety by the same routes they had thither arrived. Nevertheless, it pleased a greater part of the council that, having stored up this plan as a last resort, they in the meantime attempt the task at hand and defend the camp.
[III.4] So brief space of time passed, that scarcely could time be given for appointing and managing these matters which they had decided, when the enemy from all directions began run down at a given signal and cast stones and javelins at the rampart. At first, our men, while their strength stayed intact, bravely fought before the rampart and no javelin from their higher ground did a one send in vain, and whatever part of the camp became bare of defenders and seemed to be overwhelmed, thither rushed our men and bore aid. But in this attempt they were overmatched, for because of the long time of the fighting, the enemy who were wearied were quitting from the battle, while others with strength intact took their places -- none of which advantages were able to be employed by our men on account of their small number. And not only was the opportunity was leaving from the fighting not given to the wearied, but not even to the wounded was it given to leave the place where they were stationed and recover.
[III.5] Since already more than six hours they had been fighting, and not only their strength, but even the weapons were failing our men, and the enemy fiercer stood their ground and, while the more exhausted our men became, began they to cleave the rampart and to fill up the ditches, the matter had now come to the last resort: so P. Sextius Baculus, First-In-File Centurion, of whom we have spoken in the Nervian Battle when he was worn out by several wounds, and with him C. Volusenus, Tribune of Soldiers, a man of great wisdom and valor, rush to Galba and show to him that the one hope of safety lay in making a breakout and trying the final push. And so, with all the centurions summoned, speedily he informs the soldiers to for a time break off the battle and only the weapons cast at them should they pick up, and to recover from their toil; for after the signal is given, they are to sally out of camp and put all their hope of safety in their courage.
[III.6] What they were bid they do, and suddenly with a sally made from all gates, an opportunity was left to the enemy for neither learning of nor of amassing their forces against what our men intended. With luck so changed, these men, who had in the hope of gaining possession of the Roman camp come, were surrounded, and the Romans slew them. Out of more than 30 thousands of men, a number of barbarians which was known to have descended on the camp, more than a third were slain, and the Romans drive the rest of the terrified men into flight, and not even those on higher ground suffer to remain. Thus, with all the forces of the enemy routed and the arms of the dead were stripped, our men recover in their own fortifications. This battle finished, it was because of Galba not wishing to try his fortune any ofter and mindful was he that by one design he had come into winter quarters, yet he saw that he had met other designs; so, being moved by a lack of grain and supply lines, on the following day he set aflame all the buildings of that hamlet and hastened to return to the Province. And so, with no enemy hindering them or delaying their passage, he led an unharmed legion into the territory of the Nantuates, and thence to the Allobroges, where he wintered them.
-END OF THE CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED BY SERVIUS GALBA AGAINST THE REBELLION OF THE ALPINE GALLI LED BY THE SEDUNI-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST A CONFEDERACY OF GALLI LED BY THE VENETI-
[III.7] These things were done, and while, given all the evidence, Caesar did deem Gallia to be made peaceful, that overcome were the Belgae, driven out were the Germani, vanquished in the Alps were the Seduni, and while winter had started and he had set out for Illyricum -- for these nations he wished to visit and these regions he wished to know -- all of a sudden war in Gallia broke out. This was the cause of the war: P. Crassus, a young man with the 7th Legion, was near to the sea which we call Ocean, and among the Andes was he wintering. Because there was in these environs a lack of grain, Prefects and several Tribunes of Soldiers did Crassus send into the neighboring states for the sake of procuring grain. In their number was sent T. Terrasidius to the Esubii, M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolites, Q. Velanius with T. Silius to the Veneti.
[III.8] The latter state's prestige was by far the most widespread of every sea-faring coast of those areas, for the Veneti both have the most ships by means of which they have been wont to sail to Britannia, and also they surpass in knowledge and experience everyone else in sea-faring and navigation. For in the great swell and open vastness of the sea there are few harbors scattered about, and those which stand the Veneti themselves hold, and to nearly everyone who has been accustomed to sail that sea have the Veneti imposed taxes. The detention of Silius and Velanius was started by them, for they deemed that through our agents they would recover their hostages whom they had to Crassus given. Influenced by their authority, their neighbors, as the Galli's designs are sudden and hasty, detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same end, and, with ambassadors sent, swiftly make pledges among their chieftains that they will do nothing except by common consent and that all will endure the same outcome of fate. The rest of the states they stir to action with the result that they prefer to remain in the freedom which they had from their ancestors received rather than to endure the Romans' slavery. With all of the seacoasts quickly carried off by this feeling, they send an embassage in common among them to P. Crassus, saying that should he wish to recover his own men, they ought he to send back the hostages to them.
[III.9] Concerning these things, Caesar was by Crassus informed, for he was quite a ways off, and he bid warships to be in the meantime built in the Liger River, which flows into the Ocean, oarsmen to be drafted from the Province, and sailors and helmsmen to be readied. These things swiftly managed, Caesar himself, as soon as the time of the year allowed, hastened to his army. The Veneti and likewise the rest of the states were informed by the discovery of his arrival, and immediately understood how much of a wrong they had committed for themselves, for in respect to all nations the name of ambassador was ever held as sacred and inviolate, yet the Romans had been detained by them and into fetters thrown. So, on behalf of the great size of their peril, they decide to prepare for war and to very much oversee matters which pertain to the employment of ships; and in this they held a greater hope, for they were quite confident of the terrain of their country: for their land routes were cut up by estuaries, and navigation was hindered by ignorance of the terrain and a scarcity of harbors -- all of this they knew, and were confident that our armies, on account of a lack of grain, were not able to any longer tarry in their environs. And even if everything might happen against all their expectations, they were nevertheless very powerful in respect to their ships, more so than the Romans who neither had the use of ships, nor, in respect to where they intended to wage war, did they know any of the shoals, harbors, or islands. The Veneti understood, and had so for some time, that navigation in an enclosed sea was one thing, but in the very vast and wide open Ocean such sailing was quite different. These designs adopted, their towns they fortify, the grain they bring from the fields to the towns, all the ships, as many as they had, they gather at Venetia, where tale told Caesar would begin the war. As allies in this campaign, they adopt the Osismi, the Lexovii, the Namnetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii. Reinforcements from Britannia, a place which faced opposite their territory, they summon.
[III.10] These were the difficulties of waging war, which above we have pointed out, but nevertheless, many things urged Caesar to this war: the wrong of detaining the Roman knights, fomenting a rebellion after surrender, the release of the hostages which had been given, such a conspiracy of states, but primarily lest, if this affair is neglected, remaining states might think themselves allowed to do the same. And so, when understood he that nearly all the Galli were zealous for a revolution and to war were hastily and swiftly roused -- for all men are by nature zealous for freedom and hated the condition of slavery, so before more states joined to their cause, Caesar did think that he must divvy up and more widely deploy the army.
[III.11] And so, sendeth he T. Labienus among the Treveri, who are nearest to the Rhine River, with a contingent of horse. He orders him to go to the remaining Remi and Belgae and hold them to their duty, and also to hold off the Germani, who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae, should they try to force a crossing of the river. Biddeth he P. Crassus with 12 legionary cohorts and a great number of knights to set out for Aquitania, lest from these nations might reinforcements be sent into Gallia, and so many states might join together. Sendeth he Q. Titurius Sabinus, legate, with three legions among to Venelli, the Curiosolites, and the Lexovii, so that he might take care that this alliance be broken. He put D. Brutus, the youth, in command of the fleet and the Gallic ships which Caesar had bid him to gather from the Pictones, the Santoni, and the remaining regions which had been made peaceful; further, he bid him depart for the Veneti soon as he were able. Caesar himself thither hastened with land forces.
[III.12] The sites of their town were generally of the following kind, that they were placed on the furthest tongue-lets of land and promontories so that an approach by foot was untenable when from the sea rose the tide, a thing which always twice happened in the span of 12 hours; nor could they be approached by ship, for when the tide ebbed again, ships would be caught in the shoals. And thus because of either fact, taking the towns by force was hindered. And if ever the Veneti were by chance overpowered by the sheer size of our siege-works, which at time included damming up the sea with agger and hill -- and even sometimes making it level with the height of the walls of the town! -- and then began to despair of their fortunes, they sent out a great number of their ships, a count of which they had very high, and all of their possessions they carried off and retreated into the nearest towns. And there they again using the same characteristics of the terrain took up the defense. For a great part of the summer they more easily did this, for our ships were thrown off by storms, and it was the greatest difficulty to sail in the vast and open sea, where the swells are large, and so very rare -- nearly none -- were the harbors.
[III.13] For their ships were in the following fashion made and armed: their keels were some size flatter than those of our ships, so that more easily might they be able to endure the shoals and the ebbing of the tide. Their prows were built up to quite a degree, as well as the sterns, in order to withstand the great size of the waves and the storms. Their ships were entirely made of oak in order to bear any sort of beating and abuse. The cross benches are made by planks a foot thick, fixed together by iron nails the size of a man's thumb. The anchors were bound by iron chains in place of cords, pelts and thinly tanned leather in place of sails, either on account of a want of linen and possessing ill-knowledge of its use, or, what is more likely the truth, it is due to them thinking that such Ocean storms and such beatings of the winds could not be well enough withstood nor could the great weight of the ship be ruled by linen sails. The encounter our own fleet had with these ships of this kind resulted that in speed only and in plying the oars did we outstrip them, but in every other respect, given the nature of the terrain, given the force of the storms, theirs were more apt and well-fitted. Nor were we able to harm them with our ships' beaks, for there was such strength in them, nor on account of their great height was easily a dart-cast made at them, and because of the same reason they were less hemmed in by rocks. And additionally, it happened that, when the wind began to rage and they ran before it, they might easily bear out the storm, keep more safely to the shallows, and, after being left there by the tide, nothing they feared of rocks and shelves, and of all of these scenarios, this was a disaster which our ships had to await in dread.
[III.14] With several towns sacked, Caesar, when he understood that in vain was such a task taken up and that the flight of the enemy was not stopped after the towns were taken, nor could any harm be imposed upon them, decided he must await the fleet. When it arrived, as soon as it was seen, around 220 of the enemy ships, which were readied and decked out with every kind of armament, set out of their harbor and took up positions opposite our ships. Nor was there enough of a consensus for Brutus, who was in command, or to the Tribunes of Soldiers, or to the centurions, each of whom had been given a single ship, as to what they should do or what method of battle they should employ. For they knew that they were not able to harm them with the ships' beaks, and though they had constructed towers on the ships, nevertheless, the height of the decks of the barbarian ships towered over ours, so that from this lower height might weapons not able to be easily cast, and those thrown by the Galli fell all the heavier. There was one thing prepared beforehand which was of great use to our men: very sharp hooks were set into and fixed fast to long poles, not unlike in shape to the hooks used to grapple onto city walls. When the cords which fastened the sail-yards to the masts of the barbarian ships had been grabbed and pulled, and our ships burst forth by application of their oars, and the cords were broken. When these were cut, the sail-yard was certain to fall, with the result that, since all hope in the Gallic ships lay in the sails and armaments, when these were cut, all control of the ships was, at one moment, lost. What remained of the conflict rested on valor, in which our men easily o'erpowered, and more so because in the sight of Caesar and the entire army was the battle being waged, so that no deed a little more brave than usual could happen unseen, for all the hills and higher ground, whence commanded the nearest view to the sea, was by our army occupied.
[III.15] Their sail-yards cast down, as we have said, and although two and three of their ships surrounded a single one of ours, our soldiers with the greatest strength were fighting to board the enemy ships. After the barbarians had turned their attention to this and several of their ships were taken, and since no aid might be discovered for their situation, they hastened to seek safety by means of flight. And then, with the ships turned into the direction whither the wind bore them, suddenly, a calmness and stillness occurred so that they were not able to from their places move. Yea, this situation was of the greatest convenience for completing this business, for our men hunted them down one by one and took them by storm, with the result that very few from the whole of their number arrived at dry land at the onset of night, when it was fought from nearly the fourth hour all the way till sunset.
[III.16] In this battle, the war of the Veneti and of all the sea-coast states was over. For when all their youth, even all the aged in whom there was either some counsel or worth, had thither gathered, they had then gathered everything which they had anywhere pertaining to their fleet into that one place. When these ships were lost, those who remained had neither anywhere whither they might recover, nor any means by which to defend their towns. And so, themselves and their belongings -- all of them -- they to Caesar surrendered. Against these, Caesar decided upon exacting something more severe, so that more carefully might the legal rights of his ambassadors for the rest of the time be kept intact by the barbarians: and so, with all their senate put to death, he sold the rest as slaves at auction.
-END OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST A CONFEDERACY OF GALLI LED BY THE VENETI-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[III.17] While these matters were bring managed among the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus did into the territory of the Venelli arrive with those forces which he had from Caesar received. O'er these barbarians Viridovix was in charge, and held he the highest command of all those states which had revolted, and from them an army and great forces he had gathered. And within a few days, the Aulerci, the Eburovices, and the Lexovii, who murdered their own senate because they did not want to be the authors of the war, closed their gates and joined themselves to Viridovix, and more besides, a great number of lost men and robbers had from everywhere throughout Gallia gathered. A hope of looting and a longing for warring did call such men from the tillage of their crops and from their daily work. Sabinus, on ground which was suitable in every respect, kept to his camp, while Viridovix settled into camp at a distance two miles away, he daily led out his forces and made a show of fighting -- a result of this was that not only among the enemy was Sabinus held in contempt, but even in the chatter amongst our men he sometimes took flak. Such an opinion of his cowardice he furnished that to the rampart of the camp the enemy dared to approach. He acted this way for the following reason: he did not deem that he must engage with such a great number of the enemy, especially with the man who held the highest command being absent, unless the ground were even or some other opportunity were given to the legion.
[III.18] With this opinion of his cowardice confirmed, a certain suitable man -- and a damn clever one too -- he chose, a Gallus, from the number of those whom he had with him as reinforcements. Him he persuades with great rewards and promises to go over to the enemy and he explains to him what he wants to be done. So when he comes to the enemy as a deserter, he tells them of the cowardice of the Romans, by what setbacks Caesar himself is pressed by the Veneti, and no longer would this matter hang in the air: for the next night, Sabinus would in secret lead out from the camp his army and to Caesar he would depart for the sake of bringing aid. When this was heard, they declare, all of them, that an opportunity for handling this business well must not be lost: a march must be made to the camp. Many variables encouraged the Galli to this plan: the previous days' delay by Sabinus, the testimony of a deserter, lack of foodstuffs, a matter for which they had less carefully provided, the hope they had for the outcome of the Venetic war, and because, as it is with a good deal of men in general, they believe what they want. Influenced by these things, they do not send off Viridovix and the rest of their leaders from the council until it be permitted by them to take up arms and hasten to the Roman camp. Which request granted, they were happy as if victory were assured, and, bulks of wood and sticks gathered, they begin to use them to fill the ditches of the Romans, and to continue onward to their camp.
[III.19] Lofty was the place where camp had been pitched, and gradually did the slope from the bottom run, for about a mile. Hither they hastened in their run so that the least space might be given to the Romans for mustering and arming themselves, and so they arrived out of breath. Sabinus urged on his own men, and gave the signal to those who had been longing for it. While the enemy was encumbered by the burdens which they were carrying, Sabinus bid a sally be suddenly made from two gates. It happened due to the opportunity afforded by the terrain, the enemy's ignorance and weariness, and the valor of our men and their training from previous battles, that not even a single attack of our men could they endure, and they immediately turned their backs. The enemy were still encumbered while our own soldiers followed them with strength intact, and a great number of them they slew. The rest our knights chased down and caught the rest, but a few who had gotten clear from their flight they left. And so, at the same time both of the naval battle was Sabinus informed and of Sabinus' victory was Caesar likewise, and all the states immediately to Titurius surrendered. For, when undertaking wars, the spirits of the Galli are eager and ready, but soft and least steadfast are their minds in enduring disasters.
-END OF THE CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED BY Q. TITURIUS SABINUS AGAINST A CONFEDERACY OF GALLI LED BY VIRIDOVIX THE VENELLAN-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-THE CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED BY P. CRASSUS AGAINST A CONFEDERACY OF AQUITANIA-
[III.20] At nearly the same time, P. Crassus had into Aquitania arrived, a part which, as has been said, is to be reckoned the third part of Gallia for the breadth of its regions and the great number of its people. Since he understood that in these places he was to wage a war where, a few years earlier, L. Valerius Praeconinus, Legate, had been slain when his army was crushed, and whence L. Manlius, Proconsul, had fled with the loss of his baggage, then he thought that no middling attention must he apply. And so, with the grain supply seen to, his reinforcements and cavalry readied,, and especially many brave men were summoned by name from the regions of Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, states of Gallia which are closest to the Province, and he led his army into the territory of the Sotiates. His arrival learned of, the Sotiates, their great forces gathered, as well as their cavalry in which they were mighty, attacked our army while on the march first, and joined battle on horseback; next, once their cavalry were routed and our men were following them, they all of a sudden revealed their infantry corps, which they had hid in a valley in ambush. These attacked our men who were thrown into disarray, and thus renewed the battle.
[III.21] It was fought for a long time and fiercely, since the Sotiates, made wild because of their past victories, thought the salvation of the whole of Aquitania rested on their valor, our men desired that what they were able to accomplish without a general, without the rest of the legions, and under the leadership of a youth be seen and noticed. At last, undone by their wounds, the enemy turned their backs. With a great number of these killed, Crassus began to make an attack upon the town of the Sotiates from his march. When these bravely resisted, vineae and towers he drew up. The enemy, having sometimes attempted a sally, while having other times dug tunnels up to our agger and vineae -- a practice in which the Aquitani were by far the most skilled, especially because in many places in their country are copper mines -- when they realized that because of the diligence of our men they were unable to make any gains, to Crassus send they ambassadors and sue that he might accept their surrender. Which request obtained, once they were bid to hand over their arms, they do so.
[III.22] And while to this affair the attentions of all of our men were drawn, from another part of the town came Adiatunnus, who held the highest command, with 600 of his chosen men whom they call solduri, who keep the following custom: in every caprice of life they together enjoy with the ones to whom they have given themselves over in friendship, that if anything should happen to them by violence, either they would bear the same disaster or consign themselves to death. And not was there found in the memory of anyone up to that time anyone who, once his man to whom he had given himself in friendship had been killed, did he then refuse death -- so, with these men did Adiatunnus try to make a sally. When a great cry rose from out that part of the fortification, to their arms broke out our soldiers to a run and right there was the battle fought. Adiatunnus was pushed back into the town and nevertheless made the same request of Crassus so that he make use of the same terms of surrender.
[III.23] With arms and hostages exchanged, Crassus set out for the territory of the Vocates and Tarusates. But at that time the barbarians were in a state of upset, for they had learned that a town, fortified by its environs and by skill had been sacked within a few days after he had arrived, and they began to send off ambassadors, to swear oaths, to exchange hostages between each other, and to prepare troops. Even sent are ambassadors to those states which are Aquitanian, yet neighboring Hither-Hispania. Thence are reinforcements and commanders summoned, at whose arrival they try with great authority and with a great number of men to wage war. But those are the leaders chosen who together had been with Q. Sertorius for all those years and were deemed to possess the greatest knowledge of warcraft. These, in the custom of the Roman People, decide to seize advantageous places, fortify camps, and to close off our men from supply lines. When to which thing Crassus turned his thought, that his own troops on account of their small number were not easily able to be divided, that the enemy both wandered wide, seized passes, and left behind enough of a garrison for their camps, and because of that fact were less conveniently grain and supplies able to reach him and that day by day the number of the enemy grew, he then deemed that he must not delay and that a fight be made. This matter was brought to council, and when he understood that all felt likewise, he settled on the next day for the fight.
[III.24] At first light, with all the forces drawn out and up into a twofold battle line and the reinforcements in the center line, Crassus awaited what stratagem the enemy would take. They, even though on account of their great number and ancient glory in warfare and owing to the small number of our men, deemed to fight in safety; nevertheless, they judged it safer to secure victory without a wound by having the roads beset and supply lines closed off, so then if on account of want of grain the Romans would begin their retreat, they had thought to attack them while in depressed spirits and encumbered on their march and under their kits. This plan approved by their leaders, although the Roman forces were led forth, they kept themselves within their camp. This matter perceived, then did Crassus act, for because of their delaying and the general feeling of their cowardice had the enemy made our soldiers more eager to fight, and everyone's voices could be heard which exclaimed that no longer ought they to wait to go to the camp; so, having encouraged his troops, hastened he with all men eager to the camp of the enemy.
[III.25] Once there, some filled ditches, while others with many javelins cast knocked defenders from the rampant and the fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not trust much in the fight, once stones and javelins were handed out and soil was carried to the rampart did seem in appearance and report to be fighting men; and meanwhile, likewise by the enemy was it fought out steadily and without cowardice, and from their higher vantage did their cast javelins not in vain fall, but then our knights, having gone around the enemy camp, did to Crassus report that not with the same care had the camp been fortified at the Decumanian Gate, and the approach there was easy.
[III.26] Crassus, having encouraged the prefects of the Knights to rouse their men by means of great rewards and promises, shows what he wishes to be done. Once it had been commanded, with those cohorts which had been left behind as a garrison for the camp and who were not exhausted from toil were led out and around in a longer route lest they be able to be espied from the enemy camp, with all eyes and minds focused on the fighting, they quickly arrived at the fortifications of which we have spoken. And when these were overturned, they stood in the enemy camp before they were clearly able to be seen or anything was able to be understood as to what might be done. But then with a shout heard from that part, our men, their strength made whole again -- thing which often is accustomed to happen in the hope of victory -- harsher began to fight on. The enemy, algates surrounded and with everything despaired of, hastened to over the fortification hurl themselves and to seek safety in flight. Once the cavalry caught up to these on the very wide open plains, and when from a count of 50 thousands, which it was agreed had from Aquitania and the Cantabri gathered, scarcely a fourth part remained, late in the night they returned to the camp.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[III.28] At nearly the same time, Caesar, even though almost spent already was the summer, nevertheless, even though all Gallia was made peaceful, the Morini and the Menapii remained who were still in arms and not did they to him had sent ambassadors concerning peace, judged that this war could be completed quickly, and so thither led his army. These people by a far different approach than the rest of he Galli began to wage war: for they understood that the greatest nations which had fought in battle had been routed and o'ercome, and as they had unending forests and swamps, they thither themselves and all their possessions betook. When to the edge of these forests Caesar had arrived and had set about fortifying camp and not had an enemy been sighted, once our men were busied about in the work, suddenly from all directions of the forest they flew out and upon our men made an attack. Quickly our men took up arms and beat them back into the forests and, having killed very many, followed too far in places quite ill-trod and a few of their own they lost.
[III.29] During the rest of the following days, Caesar set about cutting down the forests, and lest any attack could be made upon a flank of unarmed and ill-attentive soldiers, all the timber which had been felled he kept gathering in piles facing the enemy and as a rampart he drew these out along either flank. With unbelievable speed a great distance was completed within a few days, and when their cattle and the end of their baggage were taken by our men and they themselves sought the thicker forests, storms of such a kind followed that the work was constantly interrupted and because of the unending nature of the rain, the soldiers could no longer be kept in their leather tents. And so, laid waste were all their crops, and their villages and buildings were burned, and Caesar led his army back among the Aulerci and Lexovii, the last states who had most recently made war on him, and there set his army into their winter quarters.
[III.21] It was fought for a long time and fiercely, since the Sotiates, made wild because of their past victories, thought the salvation of the whole of Aquitania rested on their valor, our men desired that what they were able to accomplish without a general, without the rest of the legions, and under the leadership of a youth be seen and noticed. At last, undone by their wounds, the enemy turned their backs. With a great number of these killed, Crassus began to make an attack upon the town of the Sotiates from his march. When these bravely resisted, vineae and towers he drew up. The enemy, having sometimes attempted a sally, while having other times dug tunnels up to our agger and vineae -- a practice in which the Aquitani were by far the most skilled, especially because in many places in their country are copper mines -- when they realized that because of the diligence of our men they were unable to make any gains, to Crassus send they ambassadors and sue that he might accept their surrender. Which request obtained, once they were bid to hand over their arms, they do so.
[III.22] And while to this affair the attentions of all of our men were drawn, from another part of the town came Adiatunnus, who held the highest command, with 600 of his chosen men whom they call solduri, who keep the following custom: in every caprice of life they together enjoy with the ones to whom they have given themselves over in friendship, that if anything should happen to them by violence, either they would bear the same disaster or consign themselves to death. And not was there found in the memory of anyone up to that time anyone who, once his man to whom he had given himself in friendship had been killed, did he then refuse death -- so, with these men did Adiatunnus try to make a sally. When a great cry rose from out that part of the fortification, to their arms broke out our soldiers to a run and right there was the battle fought. Adiatunnus was pushed back into the town and nevertheless made the same request of Crassus so that he make use of the same terms of surrender.
[III.23] With arms and hostages exchanged, Crassus set out for the territory of the Vocates and Tarusates. But at that time the barbarians were in a state of upset, for they had learned that a town, fortified by its environs and by skill had been sacked within a few days after he had arrived, and they began to send off ambassadors, to swear oaths, to exchange hostages between each other, and to prepare troops. Even sent are ambassadors to those states which are Aquitanian, yet neighboring Hither-Hispania. Thence are reinforcements and commanders summoned, at whose arrival they try with great authority and with a great number of men to wage war. But those are the leaders chosen who together had been with Q. Sertorius for all those years and were deemed to possess the greatest knowledge of warcraft. These, in the custom of the Roman People, decide to seize advantageous places, fortify camps, and to close off our men from supply lines. When to which thing Crassus turned his thought, that his own troops on account of their small number were not easily able to be divided, that the enemy both wandered wide, seized passes, and left behind enough of a garrison for their camps, and because of that fact were less conveniently grain and supplies able to reach him and that day by day the number of the enemy grew, he then deemed that he must not delay and that a fight be made. This matter was brought to council, and when he understood that all felt likewise, he settled on the next day for the fight.
[III.24] At first light, with all the forces drawn out and up into a twofold battle line and the reinforcements in the center line, Crassus awaited what stratagem the enemy would take. They, even though on account of their great number and ancient glory in warfare and owing to the small number of our men, deemed to fight in safety; nevertheless, they judged it safer to secure victory without a wound by having the roads beset and supply lines closed off, so then if on account of want of grain the Romans would begin their retreat, they had thought to attack them while in depressed spirits and encumbered on their march and under their kits. This plan approved by their leaders, although the Roman forces were led forth, they kept themselves within their camp. This matter perceived, then did Crassus act, for because of their delaying and the general feeling of their cowardice had the enemy made our soldiers more eager to fight, and everyone's voices could be heard which exclaimed that no longer ought they to wait to go to the camp; so, having encouraged his troops, hastened he with all men eager to the camp of the enemy.
[III.25] Once there, some filled ditches, while others with many javelins cast knocked defenders from the rampant and the fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not trust much in the fight, once stones and javelins were handed out and soil was carried to the rampart did seem in appearance and report to be fighting men; and meanwhile, likewise by the enemy was it fought out steadily and without cowardice, and from their higher vantage did their cast javelins not in vain fall, but then our knights, having gone around the enemy camp, did to Crassus report that not with the same care had the camp been fortified at the Decumanian Gate, and the approach there was easy.
[III.26] Crassus, having encouraged the prefects of the Knights to rouse their men by means of great rewards and promises, shows what he wishes to be done. Once it had been commanded, with those cohorts which had been left behind as a garrison for the camp and who were not exhausted from toil were led out and around in a longer route lest they be able to be espied from the enemy camp, with all eyes and minds focused on the fighting, they quickly arrived at the fortifications of which we have spoken. And when these were overturned, they stood in the enemy camp before they were clearly able to be seen or anything was able to be understood as to what might be done. But then with a shout heard from that part, our men, their strength made whole again -- thing which often is accustomed to happen in the hope of victory -- harsher began to fight on. The enemy, algates surrounded and with everything despaired of, hastened to over the fortification hurl themselves and to seek safety in flight. Once the cavalry caught up to these on the very wide open plains, and when from a count of 50 thousands, which it was agreed had from Aquitania and the Cantabri gathered, scarcely a fourth part remained, late in the night they returned to the camp.
[III.27] This battle heard of, the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered to Crassus and more so sent hostages to him. Among this count were Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, and Cocosates. A few of the furthest nations trusted in the time of the year, for winter was at hand, and neglected to do this.
-END OF THE CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED BY P. CRASSUS AGAINST A CONFEDERACY OF AQUITANIA-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII-
[III.28] At nearly the same time, Caesar, even though almost spent already was the summer, nevertheless, even though all Gallia was made peaceful, the Morini and the Menapii remained who were still in arms and not did they to him had sent ambassadors concerning peace, judged that this war could be completed quickly, and so thither led his army. These people by a far different approach than the rest of he Galli began to wage war: for they understood that the greatest nations which had fought in battle had been routed and o'ercome, and as they had unending forests and swamps, they thither themselves and all their possessions betook. When to the edge of these forests Caesar had arrived and had set about fortifying camp and not had an enemy been sighted, once our men were busied about in the work, suddenly from all directions of the forest they flew out and upon our men made an attack. Quickly our men took up arms and beat them back into the forests and, having killed very many, followed too far in places quite ill-trod and a few of their own they lost.
[III.29] During the rest of the following days, Caesar set about cutting down the forests, and lest any attack could be made upon a flank of unarmed and ill-attentive soldiers, all the timber which had been felled he kept gathering in piles facing the enemy and as a rampart he drew these out along either flank. With unbelievable speed a great distance was completed within a few days, and when their cattle and the end of their baggage were taken by our men and they themselves sought the thicker forests, storms of such a kind followed that the work was constantly interrupted and because of the unending nature of the rain, the soldiers could no longer be kept in their leather tents. And so, laid waste were all their crops, and their villages and buildings were burned, and Caesar led his army back among the Aulerci and Lexovii, the last states who had most recently made war on him, and there set his army into their winter quarters.
-END OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII-
No comments:
Post a Comment