C. IVLI CAESARIS COMMENTARII DE BELLO GALLICO LIBER PRIMVS - Caesar's Commentaries On The Gallic War Book I

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[I.1] Gallia as a whole is divided into three parts, of which the first the Belgae inhabit, another the Aquitani, the third, who in their own language are called Celtae, in ours are called Galli. All these in respect to language, customs, and laws differ from each other. The Garumna River separates the Galli from the Aquitani, and the Matrona and Sequana separate the Galli from the Belgae. Of all of these the strongest are the Belgae, especially because they are the furthest from the refined culture of the Province; and least often do ware-sellers travel to them and import those items which tend to weaken the spirit; and finally, they are closest to the Germani, who dwell across the Rhenus River, and with whom they wage war without end. For this reason, the Helvetii also outstrip the rest of the Galli in manliness, because in nearly daily battles they vie with the Germani, when either from their own keep them from their own borders. or they themselves wage war in the latter's. Of these mentioned, the one part (which is said the Galli hold) takes its head from the Rhodanus River, is bound by the Garumna River, by the Ocean, by the borders of the Belgae, touches even unto the Sequani' and Helvetii' borders at the Rhine River, and then stretches northward. The Belgae originate from the furthest edges of Gallia, extend to the lower region of the Rhenus, and then look out towards the north and the rising eastern sun. The Aquitani extend from the Garumna River to the Pyrenees Mountains and that part of the Ocean which faces Hispania; they look out towards the setting sun and the north. 
    

-THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETIANS-

[I.2] By far the most noble and wealthy among the Helvetians was Orgetorix. In the Consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso of 61 B.C, this man was taken by a lust for kingship, and he formed a conspiracy amongst the nobility: and the whole state he persuaded to depart from their own borders with all of their belongings. He affirmed that exceedingly easy it would be, since they surpassed all others in manliness, that they might gain an empire o'er the whole of Gallia. Yea, this reasoning more easily persuaded them than the aforesaid, given that the Helvetii are hemmed in on all sides by the natural terrain of their environs: on one side at the Rhenus, a very wide and deep river, which divides the Helvetian farmland from the Germani; on another side the Jura, a very tall mountain range, which is between the Sequani and the Helvetii; the third side at Lake Lemannus and the Rhodanus river, which divides our Province from the Helvetii. It was because of these topographical features that less widely might their people rove and less easily they might they declare war on their neighbors. Because of this, a people who lusted for warring were afflicted by a great pain. So, they deemed that they had narrow borders, which extend in length 240 miles and in width 180, for the number of their populace and for the sake of the glory of war and might. 

[I.3] By these arguments the Helvetii were led on, and because of the prestige of Orgetorix they were convinced, and so the people decided to prepare the things which pertain to making a departure; they buy up the greatest number of beasts of burden and carts; they sow as much as they can so that a supply of grain might be at hand while on their journey; finally, they establish peace and friendship with their neighboring states. To accomplish these ends, they considered a two-year period to be enough for them -- they pass a law establishing their departure in the third year. To accomplish these ends, Orgetorix is chosen, and he undertakes an ambassadorship to the neighboring states. On this errand, he persuades Casticus -- Catamantaloedes' son, a Sequani, whose father had worn the crown among the Sequani for many years had been styled "friend" and by the Senate of the Roman People -- he persuades him to take the thrown in his own state, as his father had done before. And likewise, Orgetorix persuades Dumnorix the Aeduan -- the brother of Diviciacus, who at that time held the chieftainship in his state, and had been very well liked by the commons -- he persuades him to try likewise and gives his own daughter to him in marriage. Very easily they will do what they try to accomplish, Orgetorix assures them, especially since he himself was on the verge of seizing the crown in his own state; he reassures them that there was no doubt that he would win crowns for them  with his own resources and army, since the Helvetii were the most powerful in the whole of Gallia. By this assertion they were influenced, and faith and oaths they pledge to each other that, once their power was secure, they would aspire to gain mastery over the whole of Gallia through an alliance of their own three very powerful and very strong peoples.

[I.4] This was publicly reported to the Helvetii through informers. According to their own customs, Orgetorix they compelled to plead his case from chains -- if condemned, he was to accept his punishment, to be consumed by fire. On the appointed day for pleading his case, Orgetorix gathered to the court all of his own household, up to ten-thousand persons, from everywhere; and also all his clients and debtors, of whom he had a great number, he led to the same place. Through the agency of these people, lest he plead his case, he escaped. When the state, which was roused to arms on account of this affair tried to execute its law, and the magistrates gathered a throng of men from the fields, Orgetorix died. There is no doubt that he killed himself (which is what the Helvetii think).   

[I.5] After the death of Orgetorix, the Helvetii no less attempt to carry out all which they had decided on doing, namely leaving from their territory. To that end, all their towns, in number nearing twelve, and all their hamlets numbering some 400 odd, and all their private buildings they set aflame. Additionally, all the grain apart from that which they intended to carry with them they burn, so that with the hope of a homeward return denied, they might be more prepared to undergo all dangers. They further order a three months' supply of ground grain be carried by each person from home. They persuade the Rauraci and the Tulingi and the Latobrigi, their neighbors, to adopt the same plan: that after burning their towns and hamlets, they as one depart; and the Boii, who across the Rhenus had once lived, but had since crossed into the farmland of Noreia they had long been attacking their cities there, these Boii the Helvetians claim as allies.  

[I.6 - March 28th, 58 B.C.] There were two routes by which they might be able to leave from home: one route through the Sequani, a route narrow and hard, between the Jura Mountains and the Rhône River, by which scarcely carts in single file might be led; besides this, the mountain hangs so very high overhead that easily very few might take position and be able to cut them off; the other route is through our Province, a route much easier and more flighty, especially because the Rhône flows between the borders of the Helvetians and the Allobroges (who had been newly made peaceful) and in several shallow places is fordable. The outermost town of the Allobroges and the nearest to the Helvetii' borders is Geneva. From said town is a bridge extending to the Helvetii. The the Helvetii had in mind either to persuade the Allobroges, on the grounds that they seemed to not yet have good intentions towards the Roman People, or to compel them by force to suffer them to go through their borders. With all these matters prepared for the departure, they announce the day on which all should gather at the riverside of the Rhodanus: this day was the fifth day before the Kalends of April in the Consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius  

[I.7] When to Caesar this had been reported, that through our Province were they trying to make their route, he hastened from the City to depart and, by the greatest possible marches, he hurried into Hinter-Gallia and arrived at Geneva. He commands the entire Province to provide the greatest number of soldiers (there was altogether in Hinter-Gallia one legion) and he bids the bridge which led to Geneva be cut down. When of his arrival the Helvetii were informed, they send to him envoys, the most noble of their state, of whom Nammeius and Verucloetius occupied the foremost place; and they said that it was in their intention to pass through the Province without committing any wrong-doing, especially because they had no other way. They ask this so they may do so with Caesar's permission and blessing. Caesar, because he had in his memory that Lucius Cassius the Consul was slain and his army had been routed and sent under the yoke by the Helvetii, thus did not think it prudent to yield to this request. Nor did he think he must give any consideration to these peoples who had a hostile disposition, and, once permission was given to them to go through the Province, would they keep themselves from harm and wrongdoing. Nevertheless, so that Caesar could buy himself some breathing room while the soldiers which he had ordered could muster, he replied to the ambassadors that he would require some days to deliberate. If they wished for anything, they could return at the Ides of April.

 
[I.8 - March 28th - April 13th, 58 B.C.] In the meantime, with both the legion which he had with him, and with the soldiers who had mustered out of the Province, Caesar led to completion a wall from Lake Geneva, which flows into the Rhône River, to the Jura Mountains, which separates the borders of the Sequani from the Helvetii, for the length of 19 miles, in height sixteen feet, and a ditch. After this work was completed, garrisons he set at intervals, small forts he strengthened, so that if the Helvetii may try to cross , against Caesar's expressed wish, he might be able to hold them off. When the day which he had confirmed with the ambassadors arrived and the ambassadors returned to him, he said that, according to the practice and example of the Roman People, could he not grant a journey for anyone through the Province and, if they should attempt to use force, he made it clear that he would stop them. The Helvetii, despite being robbed of their hope, lashed together boats and made several rafts, and made attempts upon the fortification by keeping to the shoals of the Rhône where least was the depth of the river. Sometimes during the daytime, ofter at night they tried to see if they might be able to break through; but, due to the strength of the work and the cohesion of the soldiers and their missiles, the Helvetii ceased from this attempt. 

[I.9] There was left one way remaining through the Sequani, by which, since the Sequani had forbidden them, the Helvetii were not able to go on account of the path's narrowness. Since the Helvetii were not able to persuade these Sequani on their own accord, they send ambassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan to obtain permission from the Sequani. Dumnorix, because of his charity and generosity among the Sequani was very preeminent and to the Helvetii he was a friend --on account of from that very state had he Orgetorix's daughter wed; likewise by a lust for kingship led on, he for a revolution was eager and as many states as possible by means of his own good works was he wishing to possess them beholden. And so this matter he undertakes and from the Sequani permission he obtains, so that through their borders they the Helvetii to pass may suffer; and he effects it so that hostages they exchange between them: the Sequani do so, lest on their march they may not the Helvetii hold off, the Helvetii, so that without wrongdoing and injury they may cross.
[I.10] To Caesar it is reported that the Helvetians have in mind to journey through the farmland of the Sequani and the Aeduans, and then into the Santones' borders, a people not far off from the Tolsates' borders, who are in turn a people in the Province. If this were to come to pass, then Caesar understood that in a great danger would be the Province be, should it these warlike peoples, enemies of the Roman People, have as neighbors while their lands lie open -- a great many of them grain-bearing. On account of these reasons, in charge of this fortification which he had made did Caesar install Titus Labienus as Legion Commander; in the meantime, Caesar himself into Italy by forced marches hastened and two legions he there levied and three, which were around Aquileia wintering, he out of their winter-camps he drew out; then, where there was the nearest route into Farther Gaul through the Alps, with these five legions to go he hastened. In that place, the Ceutrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges, after occupying higher ground, did try Caesar's army to keep off. Several of these were in battles routed around Ocelo, which is a town in the Hither-Province's outermost, and in the borders of the Vocontes of the Hinter-Province on the seventh day he arrived. Thence into the Allobroges' borders, then from the Allobroges into the Segusiagi his army he led. These beyond the Province across the Rhône are the first.

[I.11] The Helvetians had already through the narrows and borders of the Sequani led across their troops and into the borders of the Aeduans they had arrived - and there they were laying waste to their fields. The Aedui, since they themselves were unable to defend their own from these, ambassadors to Caesar they send to ask for aid: namely that, at every time, in the eyes of the Roman People they had deemed themselves worthy that they did not deserve that within near sight of our army their fields were laid waste, their children into slavery led off, and their towns razed. At that same time as the Aeduans, the Ambarri, relations and kinsmen of the Aeduans, inform Caesar that since their fields were destroyed, not easily were they holding off the might of the enemy from the towns. Likewise the Allobroges, who across the Rhône did hamlets and holdings own, in flight retreat unto Caesar and make known to him that, apart from the dust of their farmland, nothing else was left. By these facts swayed, Caesar decided that he must not wait until after all the allies' fortunes had been swallowed up as the Helvetians arrived at the Santones' land.

[I.12] The Arar River, which through the boundaries of the Aeduans and the Sequani and into the Rhône it flows, is of unbelievable slowness, such that into which direction it flows one is unable to judge. It the Helvetians in rafts and skiffs lashed together were crossing. When through scouts Caesar was informed that already three parts of their forces the Helvetians had said river crossed, and that yet a fourth part on the hitherbank of the Arar had been left behind, around the third watch, with three legions from camp he set out and to this part he arrived, the one which had not yet crossed the river. Upon these, hindered and unaware, did Caesar advance and a great portion of them he slaughtered. The rest of these took to flight and into the nearest forests hid themselves. That one canton, when it had from home departed, within our fathers' memory it Lucius Cassius had slain and it his army under the yoke had sent. And so either by some chance happening or by the design of the deathless gods, said part of the Helvetian state, which had a remarkable calamity upon the Roman People inflicted, foremost served their punishment. In this regard, Caesar not only public, but even private wrongs did avenge, namely that his father-in-law Lucius Piso's grandfather, Lucius Piso the Legion Commander, had the Tigurine Canton in the same battle -- the one in which it had the aforementioned Cassius -- slain.  

[I.13] This battle finished, so that the remaining forces of the Helvetians he might pursue, a bridge upon the Arar Caesar takes care to be thrown and then his army leadeth he across. The Helvetians by his sudden arrival were alarmed, since that which they themselves within 20 days with the most difficulty had accomplished so that they might the river cross, and then understand they that this in a single day Caesar had done, ambassadors to him they send. This embassage's foremost member was Divico, who in the war with Cassius had been the leader of the Helvetians. This one thusly with Caesar treated: 

If peace the Roman People with the Helvetians might make, into a to-be-defined area would the Helvetians go and there they would be where Caesar for them had decided and he had willed; but if in warfare upon them he might insist to visit, he would be reminded both of the old misfortune of the Roman People and of the long-held valor of the Helvetians; and that caught-unawares one canton Caesar had rushed, when those who the river had already crossed were to their fellows unable to bear aid - lest Caesar, on account of this fact, either his own valor he might overly rate or the Helvetians he might look down on; further, that thus from their fathers and their own forebearers they had learned to more with valor contend rather than upon trickery or ambuscades to rely. For this reason, Caesar ought not to join battle, with the end result that this place where they had conferenced, would either because of some disaster of the Roman People and the utter destruction of the Roman army gain a name for itself, or give it lasting remembrance.

[I.14] To these, Caesar thus replied: 

In regard to his conduct less hesitation would he grant, for these recollections to which the Helvetian ambassadors referred he still held in memory. And on this account the more vexed was he that less deservedly had these things befallen the Roman People. For if the Roman People were of any wrongdoing knowledgeable, it would not have been difficult for them to take precaution. But they had been deceived, for neither did they understand anything had been done by them for which they ought to be afraid, nor without cause did they think they ought to be afraid. But if the old affront he wished to forget, what yet of recent wrongs? That even though he was unconsenting, a march through the Province by force they had attempted; what of the Aeduans, what of the Ambarri, what of the Allobroges -- these peoples the Helvetians had harassed -- was this memory Caesar able to set aside? That because of this victory of theirs so cheekily do they boast; and that for so long they do marvel at the wrongs they have with impunity inflicted -- it comes to the same end: for wont are the deathless gods so that more weightily men may from an utter reversal of their fortunes smart for it, and that upon these men whom on account of their wickedness the gods wish to wreak vengeance, and to these men rather favorable affairs -- favorable for the time being -- and longer-lasting impunity the gods yield. But, since these things are so, if hostages from their own to him they should give, so that the things which they promise Caesar may be assured that they will do, and if to the Aeduans concerning the wrongs, which to them and their allies they had inflicted, and likewise to the Allobroges they give satisfaction, the he with them would make peace. 

Divico replied that the Helvetians from their forebearers had learned to be wont to receive hostages, not give them: of this fact, the Roman People are a witness. 

This reply given, he departed.

[I.15] The next day, they strike camp from this place. Likewise does Caesar also do and all his horse, in number nearly four-thousand which from the whole province and the Aeduans -- and even some gathered from their allies -- he sends forth, so that they may see into which directions the enemy march. Those who too zealously pursued the rearguard on unfavorable ground join battle with the horse of the Helvetians and a few of ours fall. By this battle were the Helvetians carried away, since by means of five-hundred Knights had they such a multitude of horse driven off, and so more boldly did they begin to take position and by means of battle to tire our men in the rear. Caesar was his own men from battle keeping back, as he was considering it enough at present to keep the enemy from plundering, foraging, and destruction. And so, for days -- around 15 -- they marched so that between the enemy rear and our van there lay five or six miles.

[I.16] Meanwhile, daily was Caesar pressing the Aeduans concerning the grain which they had publicly promised. For on account of the cold spells -- as Gaul at the foot of the North doth lie, as has been said -- not only were the standing crops in the fields not ready for harvesting, but not even the fodder was available a great enough supply. Besides this grain, which on the Arar had been sent upriver, Caesar was less able to make use because the Helvetians, the very ones whom he did not wish to let off, had turned aside their march from the Arar. Day after day, the Aeduans lead him on: they report that the grain is being gathered, then transported, then it is at hand. When Caesar deduced that further he was being led on, he then names the day on which day the grain to the soldiers ought to be meted out. When their chieftains were summoned, of whom a great supply in camp he had -- among their number was Diviacus and Liscus, a man who the highest magistracy held sway, whom the Helvetians name Vergobretum, who is elected annually and the power of life and death among his own people holdeth he -- and sternly Caesar rebukes them, namely: because grain he was able to neither buy nor take from the fields; and that the time so needful and the enemy so near, Caesar was not being relieved by them; and especially because of a great deal of their influence was he by their prayers influenced and had taken up the war. Yea, much more sternly was this bemoaned, that he was forsaken.

[I.17] Then at last, Liscus, by this speech of Caesar influenced, proposeth that which before he had been silent: that several men, whose prestige among the commons was very mighty, and who as private citizens were more powerful than the magistrates themselves, and these with mutinous and reckless chatter were frightening the masses lest the grain which they owe they compile. If they should be unable to obtain the chieftainship of Gaul, then they ought to prefer the rule of Gauls rather than of Romans; nor did they doubt that should the Romans overcome the Helvetians, then, together with the rest of Gaul, they would be ready to wrest freedom from the Aeduans. By these same men are our plans and such things which are managed in camp to the enemy reported. Further, that these men are not by him able to be checked. Nay even more, because this necessary information he was driven to report to Caesar, he understood with how much danger he had done this thing and, because of this reasoning, he had for so long been able to keep his silence.

[I.18] Caesar, because of this talk of Liscus, felt that Dumnorix, the brother of Diviciacus, was indicated; but, because in the company of so many persons he did not wish these matters to be bantered about, quickly the assemblage he broke up and kept Liscus back. Questions he him alone concerning the things which he had in the gathering spoken. Speaketh he more freely and more boldly. Concerning the same information in secret Caesar questions others - he learns that the following things are true: that Dumnorix himself, because of the highest haughtiness and the great good-standing amongst the commons he has on account of his generosity, is desirous of a revolution. For very many years, the customs and all the remaining taxes of the Aeduans at a small price he was in the habit of buying back, especially because when he bid at auction, against him none durst bid. By these means, both his own private dealings he has increased as well as the great opportunities for bribery he has furnished. A great number of the cavalry at his own cost he maintains and about his person he keeps them. And not only at home, but even among the neighboring states is he largely influential and, for the sake of his power, his mother he gave in marriage to a man among the Bituriges, a man there most noble and powerful; and he himself a wife from the Helvetians had, and his sister on his mother's side and his nearest female relations he had given in marriage to other states. And favoreth and desireth he the Helvetians on account of this connection, and on his own account hateth he Caesar and the Romans, because at their arrival his power was lessened and his brother Diviciacus into his former place of good-standing and honor has been restored. If anything were to happen to the Romans, he would come into the highest hope of obtaining kingship through the Helvetians; but under the rule of the Roman People, not only of the kingship would he deprived, but even of that good-standing which he had. Yet further, Caesar discovered in his questioning that the cavalry skirmish, the unsuccessful one which had a few days ago happened, the beginning of that rout was done by Dumnorix and his knights, for Dumnorix was in command of this cavalry, which the Aeduans had sent as an aid for Caesar, and because of their flight did the remaining horse take fright.

[I.19] When these things were made known, and since to these suspicions the most sure facts were added, namely that through the borders of the Sequani Dumnorix had led the Helvetians; that Dumnorix had arranged hostages must needs be exchanged; that all said things had not only without Caesar's own bidding and the bidding of the state been done, but even with both parties themselves unknowing; that by a magistrate of the Aeduans he was accused; and there was enough cause Caesar reasoned, for which Caesar himself might attend to Dumnorix's punishment or he might bid the state to do so. In regards to all of these matters, one thing stood in the way: namely, the man's brother Diviciacus' highest zeal for the Roman People, his highest good-will towards Caesar, his outstanding faithfulness, justice, and temperance -- all of which Caesar had learned. For Caesar feared that by Dumnorix's punishment he would offend the feelings of Diviciacus. And so, before he attempts anything, Caesar bids Diviciacus be summoned to him; and, when the day-to-day interpreters were withdrawn, Caesar, through Gaius Valerius Troucillus -- a chieftain of the province of Gaul, an intimate friend of his, in whom the highest faith in all matters he had -- converses with Diviciacus. Caesar related to the man of what in his own presence in the council of the Gauls was said of him, and he shows what privately in his presence each one said of him. Asketh and urgeth Caesar without offering offense to Diviciacus' feelings that either Caesar himself may on Dumnorix pass sentence once the case is tried, or biddeth he the state to do so.

[I.20] Diviciacus with many tears embraced Caesar and began to beseech him lest a more serious sentence he might pass on his brother. Saieth he that he knows that those charges are true, and no one is on account of this pained more than he, especially since, when he himself by his good-standing had very much increased in power at home and in the rest of Gaul, yon Dumnorix had done so very little on account of his youth. These sinews of power had Dumnorix employed for not merely lessening Diviciacus' good-standing, but for his near-ruination. Nevertheless, because of both brotherly affection and the estimation of the common people, Diviciacus is moved. If anything rather serious would have been done by Caesar, since Diviciacus himself kept such a place of friendship with Caesar, no one would imagine that the punishment had occurred without Diviciacus' consent. Because of such a thing, it would happen that the hearts of the whole of Gaul would turn from Diviciacus. Such things while shedding many tears does he from Caesar beg. Caesar his right hand taketh. Having consoled him, asketh Caesar that he end his entreating. Of such a kind is the good-standing which Diviciacus has with Caesar that he assures him that both the wrong done to the Republic and this personal slight does Caesar because of his wish and prayers forgive. Dumnorix to himself Caesar calls, and his brother he brings forth. Caesar points out the things which he find faults in Dumnorix. Then Caesar doth lay out the things which Caesar himself understands, then of the things of which the state complains. He warns him that for the meantime he should avoid all suspicions. These past deeds Caesar says that he forgives because Diviciacus is his brother. Upon Dumnorix does he place spies, so that what he does and with whom he converses Caesar is able to know.

[I.21] On the same day, through scouts was Caesar informed that the enemy had settled at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp. Of what sort of terrain the mountain had and of what sort of climb it was around it -- Caesar sent forth some to find out: it is announced that the way is easy. Around the third watch does he bid Titus Labienus, a legate acting as a Praetor, with two legions and those guides who learned the way, to scale the highest ridge. What sort of plan he has does Caesar explain. Then he himself -- around the fourth watch -- on the same route by which the enemy had gone does he hasten to them and sendeth he forth all his horse ahead of him. Publius Considius, who in military matters was considered the most experienced and had in the army of Lucius Sulla and later in Marcus Crassus' army served, with scouts is sent ahead.

[I.22] At first light, while the mountain's height was by Labienus held, Caesar himself was not from the enemy camp more than a mile and a half away; and not -- as later he learned from captives -- was his own arrival or that of Labienus' known. Considius at full gallop raced to Caesar and saieth he that the mountain, the one which he had by Labienus wished to be seized, was now by the enemy held -- this he had known by the Gallic arms and ensigns. His own troops Caesar led to the foot of the nearest hill, and battle array he drew up. Labienus, while he had been commanded by Caesar not to join battle unless his own forces near the enemy camp had been seen -- this was so that all at once and on all sides the attack might happen -- was, after the mountain was seized, awaiting our men and holding off from battle. Finally, late in the day, did through scouts Caesar learn that: the mountain was by our men held; the Helvetians had broken camp; and Considius, struck by fear, had that which he had not seen reported as something he had seen. On that day at the interval he was accustomed to keep, the enemy Caesar follows. And three miles from their camp he pitches camp.

[I.23] The day after this, as there was altogether a two day span remaining within which to the army grain ought to be measured out, and as from Bibracte, a town of the Aeduans by far the largest and most plentiful, not more than 18 miles was he away, and deemed that the grain supply must be seen to. And so his route from the Helvetians he turned aside and hastened to Bibracte to go. This fact through runaways of Lucius Aemilius, a decurion of the Gallic Knights, to the enemy is reported. The Helvetians, either on the grounds that they imagined the Romans, struck by fear, were withdrawing from them; or the more so that, though the higher ground they previously took, did not offer battle; or perhaps they had faith that the Romans could from their grain store be shut off; so their plan they changed and their route they turned aside so that our men they began to overtake from the rear and harass.

[I.24 - c. June 20th, 58 B.C.] After he turned his attention to this, Caesar his own forces he led to the foot of the nearest hill, and his horse -- who would withstand the attack of the enemy -- he sent forth. In the meantime, Caesar himself drew up at the middle of the hill the trifold battle array of his four veteran legions. At the top, the two legions which in Hither-Gaul he had lately enrolled -- as well as all the auxiliary troops -- there Caesar placed them; it was thus that above him, the whole mount was with men filled. The baggage and soldiers' packs into one place to be gathered he bade and here those who in the higher battle array had taken ground he ordered to fortify. The Helvetii with all of their own carts followed and bore all their baggage together into one place; then they formed up in very close quarters, routed our horse, drew up into a phalanx and approached to the foot of our foremost battle line.

[I.25] Caesar first sent off his own horse, then everyone's horses were sent out of sight so that everyone's danger was equaled and he might remove the hope of flight; he urged on his men and then joined battle. The soldiers, who from their higher vantage lobbed their javelins, easily broke apart the enemy phalanx. After the formation scattered into pieces, the soldiers drew their swords and made a charge upon them. The Gauls had a great hindrance to their combat, namely that when several of their shields had by a single blow of the javelins been pierced through and held fast when the iron bent upon itself -- then neither were the men able to withdraw the javelin nor to fight needfully enough with their left hand so hindered. Many, after having for long cast their arm about, chose rather to throw their shield from their hand and with undefended body fight. At last they were by their wounds wearied, and they began to lose their footing, and then, since there was a hill around a mile away, thither they betook themselves. Once the hill was taken and our men were approaching its foot, the Boii and the Tulingi -- who around 15,000 men numbered, they were closing the train of the enemy and acted as a support for the rear on the march -- they advanced to surround our men on their exposed side. And the Helvetii who had retreated up the hill having espied this began to make a second stand and to renew the battle. The Romans, their military standards turned, bore the fight on two sides: the first and second line moved to withstand the defeated and the deserters, the third to withhold the oncomers.

[I.26] And so, twofold was the battle for a long time and fiercely fought. When no longer could they withstand the charge of our men, one group -- as they had already begun -- retreated upon the hill; the other group betook themselves to the baggage and carts. For during the whole of the battle, while from the seventh hour to eventide it carried on, that none were able to see a single enemy's turned back. Even unto late in the night the fight continued at the baggage, especially because they had piled upwards their carts as a rampart and from this higher ground they were hurling their weapons upon our charging men. And several were casting their Gallic javelins and darts between the carts and the wheels underneath and were thus wounding our men. When the battle had been for a long time fought, our men gained possession of the baggage and camp. There Orgetorix's daughter and one of his sons was taken. After this battle, around 130,000 survived and during that night they marched without end;  After stopping their march for no part of the night, they arrived at the Lingones' borders on the fourth day. Both on account of the soldiers' wounds and the burial of the slain, our men delayed for three days and thus had been unable to follow them. Caesar send letters and messengers to the Lingones lest with grain or anything else they might aid the Helvetii; but if they should aid them, then Caesar would consider them in the same light as the Helvetii. Once the third day had passed, Caesar  began to follow them with all of his forces.

[I.27] The Helvetii, influenced by a want of everything, sent their ambassadors concerning surrender to Caesar. When these had to him en route arrived, themselves they threw down at his feet and, speaking as suppliants, they wept and begged for peace. And to them he bade that in that place where they at that time were they await his arrival -- they obeyed. And thither Caesar afterwards arrived. Hostages, arms, the slaves who had fled to them -- demandeth he all of them. While these affairs were being asked after and gathered, a night passed, and nearly 6,000 persons of that canton which is called Verbigenus -- either struck by fear lest because their arms were surrendered and they might suffer punishment, or they were overtaken by a hope of salvation -- the fact is that given such a multitude of people who had surrendered, they judged their own flight might be able to either be hidden or altogether overlooked: so, they left the camp of the Helvetii early in the night and made haste to the Rhenus and the borders of the Germani.



[I.28] When of this matter Caesar learned and to whose borders they had gone, these peoples he commands that the Germans gather and bring back, if absolved they wish to be -- those brought back he considered to be in the number of the enemy. The rest of them -- once the hostages, arms, and deserts had been given up -- did Caesar receive into surrender. The Helvetians, the Tulingi, the Latobrigi -- into their own territories whence they had set out he bade be returned, and, since they had lost all their crops and there was nothing at home by which starvation might be withstood, Caesar bid the Allobroges to upon them render a grain supply. Their towns and hamlets which they had burned he bid themselves to rebuild. This with the greatest calculation he did: for he did not want that the place whence the Helvetians had left to be empty, lest on account of the goodness of the tillage that the Germans, who across the Rhine dwell, would from their own territory cross into the Helvetians' territory; and the neighbors to Gaul, the Province, and the Allobroges they would be.

[I.29] In the camp of the Helvetians, tablets were found in Greek letters filled out, and these to Caesar were handed over. In these tablets, name-by-name had the reckoning been done: what number had from their home left; of these, who arms were able to bear; and likewise, but separately, how many boys, old men, and women. Taking all of these categories together, the full count was: of Helvetians, 268,000 head; of Tulingi, 36, 000; of Latobrigi, 14,000; of Rauraci, 23,000; of Boii, 32,000. Out of these, those who arms were able to bear were upwards of ninety-two thousands. The full count of all of these was upwards of 368,000. Of these, those who homeward returned -- after the headcount was taken as Caesar had ordered -- found was the number of 110,000 thousands.

-END OF THE HELVETIAN CAMPAIGN-

[I.30] Once the war of the Helvetians was finished, from nearly the whole of Gaul did legates to Caesar come in order to extend thanksgiving. They said that they understood that, while yea, on behalf of the old wrongs of the Helvetians towards the Roman People had Caesar sought from these very peoples punishments by means of warfare, nevertheless this affair had not less for the advantage of Gaul happened than for the Roman People. For this was especially because of that plan by which despite their affairs being most in bloom that the Helvetians had from their own homes quit, so that upon the whole of Gaul they might inflict war and an empire they might obtain. And a place for a new home because of plenty they had chosen, a place which out of all of Gaul they the most at hand and the most fruitful had deemed. They asked that it be permitted for them an assembly of the whole of Gaul be on a certain day fixed and that it by the will of Caesar be done. They say that they have certain matters of business regarding common opinion which to ask of him they wish. After this idea was agreed upon, a date for the assembly they decided, and by oath they swear, lest any make an announcement of this except to those whom by common agreement it had been ordered. Thus amongst themselves they swore.

-THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS THE GERMAN-

[I.31] After this assembly was dismissed, the same chieftains of the states who had gathered before returned to Caesar and asked that with him they might in secret consult with him concerning their own affairs and the well-being of all. This request granted, all of them weeping at Caesar's feet threw themselves. They say that no less do they beg and toil for this chance so that not the matters which they had previously discussed are reported in public, than these which they desire they obtain by entreaty; especially because, if this were to be announced, to the greatest torments they know they would be subjected. Spoke he on behalf of these men, he Diviacus the Aeduan, who said that of the whole of Gaul there were two powers: of these, the tribalship of one the Aedui held, the other the Arverni. When these peopled with so much power had amongst themselves for many years been striving, it had happened that by the Arverni and the Sequani were Germans being brought in with the promise of coin. Of these Germans, around 15 thousands had first crossed the Rhine; after that, the crops, and the culture, and the forces of the Gauls these beastly and savage men had destroyed, and more Gauls dragged off. Now they were in Gaul proper -- 100 and 20 thousands their number. When with these Germans the Aedui and their bannermen once and then again with arms did fight, a great disaster they received -- they had been beaten, and all their nobility, their elders, their calvary, lost. By these battles and disasters they were broken, these men who by merits of their own courage and because of the benefactions and friendship of the Roman People had been once able to the chiefest in Gaul; they had ben compelled to the Sequani to give hostages, the most noble of their state, and to swear by oath not to against their state draw swords, nor these hostages to ask after, nor aid from the Roman People to implore, nor object to any less than to be forever under their terms and power. Diviciacus himself said that he out of the entire citizenry of the Aedui had not been able to be influenced to either swear or to give his own children as hostages -- on account of this, he had from the state fled, and to Rome and the Senate he had come to ask for aid, for he alone neither by oath nor by hostages was bound. But something worse to the victorious Sequani rather than to the defeated Aedui had then happened: for Ariovistus, a king of the Germans, their territory he had besieged and a one-third area of the Sequani farmland, which had been the best in the whole of Gaul, he had seized; and now from another one-third area he bid the Sequani depart, for a few months before had 24 thousands of people from the Harudes tribe come to him and for these people were a place and settlement being prepared. It would be within a few years that all the peoples in the boundaries of Gaul would be beaten and all the Germans would cross the Rhine. For of course, saieth Diviciacus, that Gallic land must be comparable with the Germans' land, nor must the latter's quality of life be brought to the same level as the former. Moreover, Ariovistus, as soon as he had the forces of the Gauls conquered at a battle which occurred at Magetobriga, haughtily and cruelly he ruled, and hostages of each of the most noble among them -- yea, their children -- he demanded, and upon them all manner of things and tortures he inflicted if something to his nod or will was not done. This man, saieth Diviciacus, is a savage -- wrathful and reckless. Not able were his commands to be borne -- not any longer. Unless in Caesar and in the Roman People some aid be found, all the Gauls must likewise do what the Helvetians did -- namely, that from their home they emigrate, and some other place to live, other settlements removed from the Germans they seek, and their fortune -- whatever should befall them -- they try. Further, if these things were to be announced to Ariovistus, Diviciacus did not doubt that from all the hostages who were about him, the most serious punishment he would exact. And finally, saieth Diviciacus that Caesar, either by means of his influence or that of his army, or his recent victory, or by the name of the Roman People be he able to intimidate the king, lest a greater number of Germans might across the Rhine be led, and all of Gaul be he from the wrongs of Ariovistus able to defend.

[I.32] This speech of Diviciacus given, all who were present with much weeping began to aid from Caesar beg. Turneth Caesar his attention to the Sequani, the only ones of all who did none of those things which the rest were doing, but the grim creatures with downcast head at the earth did gaze. What was the cause of such a thing, amazed he asked of themselves. There was nothing, replied the Sequani, but in the same grimness they silent remained. When after these he ofter asked and not were any voice at all were they able to squeeze out, likewise Diviciacus the Aeduan replied, saying that the more wretched and serious be the lot of the Sequani than the rest, for they alone not even in secret to complain nor to aid beseech they durst -- and even while absent, at the cruelty of Ariovistus they shuddered as if he were present. This was particularly because of all the rest of them, while opportunity for flight was possible, instead, for the Sequani, who into their lands had Ariovistus received and all of those whose town were under his power, must every torment undergo.

[I.33] With these things made known, Caesar did the Galli's spirits with his words hearten and promised he that in regards to this matter he himself would take great care to be an aid, saying that a great hope he had that Ariovistus would by both Caesar's favors and prestige bring about an end to his wrongs. This speech made, the council he dismissed. 

And besides these claims, many matters urged Caesar to think that this affair must be considered and undertaken, in the first place because the Aedui -- styled as oft as they were as "brothers" and "kinsmen" by a number of members in the Senate -- Caesar saw to be under the thralldom and rule of the Germani; and he had come to understand that their hostages were among Ariovistus and the Sequani, a thing which he deemed in so great an empire as belonging to the Roman People to be most shameful to himself and to the Republic. Besides, he saw that gradually the Germani were growing more accustomed to crossing the Rhenus and that a great number of their people were coming into Gallia, a thing most perilous to the Roman People. Nor was Caesar supposing that these fierce and savage people would keep themselves in check -- nay, rather, they would, when they had seized all of Gallia as the Cimbri and the Teutones had done before, would then leave said territory for the Province, and thence hasten into Italy, particularly since merely the Rhodanus divides the Sequani from our Province -- these things Caesar thought must happen as hastily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus himself had adopted such a demeanor and haughtiness that he did not seem to be endured. 

[I.34] On account of this, it pleased Caesar that he sendeth to Ariovistus ambassadors to ask of him that some locale in the middle of either of them might he choose for a parlay, for Caesar wished to treat with him concerning the Republic and of matters weightiest to both parties. Ariovistus replied to this embassage: 

If he himself had needed anything from Caesar, he would have come to him; if Caesar should want anything of him, then it would behoove him to come to him. Further, neither neither did he dare to come into those parts of Gallia which Caesar possessed without an army, nor was he able to bring together into a single place an army without great expense and trouble. Moreover it seemed to him strange what business either Caesar or the Roman People at all had in his own region of Gallia which he had conquered.

[I.35] Once these replies were to Caesar relayed, again to Ariovistus doth Caesar send ambassadors with the following commands: 
Since Ariovistus had once been given by Caesar and the Roman People's such great favor, namely when in Caesar's own Consulship the titles "King" and "Friend" he had been styled by the Senate, such doth he repay this thanks to Caesar and to the Roman People, that when to a parlay he hath been invited, he acts with reluctance, nor does he deem that anything concerning a matter of mutual importance must be spoken of and considered. These then are matters which Caesar requires of him: first, not another large number of people should he lead across the Rhine; then, the hostages which he had in his possession from the Aedui he should return, and he should entrust to the Sequani that these hostages might be allowed to return home by his leave; neither should he exact any wrongdoing upon the Aedui, nor should he make war upon these peoples and their allies. If he will have done thusly, then for him shall have the everlasting thanks of the Roman People and the personal friendship with Caesar; and should Caesar not obtain this request, then he himself would not overlook the wrongdoing towards the Aedui, since in the Consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso the Senate had decreed that whosoever should govern the Gallic Province, as far as he doth act in alignment with the Republic, said person should defend both the Aedui and the rest of the friends of the Roman People.

[I.36] To this, Ariovistus replied:
It is the law of war that those who had conquered would then command those whom they had conquered to whatever end they wished. Likewise, the Roman People ought to command their conquered not according to the precepts of any outside influence, but according to their own judgment. If Ariovistus himself did not lay his own influence upon the Roman people as to how they ought to exact their rights over their conquered, then it was not necessary for him be hindered by the Roman people when he was exacting his rights. It is as the Aedui are to him -- since they had tried the fortune of war and had gathered in arms and then o'ercome, they had then become tributary. Great is the wrong Caesar does, for he doth make Ariovistus' revenues less valuable to him. As to restoring to the Aedui their hostages, Ariovistus shall not, but he shall wrongfully inflict war neither upon the Aedui nor their allies if they should remain in their place where it had been agreed, and they annually paid their tribute. If they did not do this, then far from a "brotherly" feeling would he have in respect to the Roman People. And as far as Caesar threatening him that "he himself would not overlook the wrongdoing towards the Aedui" -- no one had fought with Ariovistus without meeting their own destruction. Whenever Caesar might wish, he might engage with Ariovistus -- then he will understand what the undefeated Germans, the most trained in arms, who had not in 14 years gone under a roof, might achieve by means of valor.

[I.37] At the same as these "commands" were borne to Caesar, both ambassadors from the Aedui and also from the Treveri were arriving. The Aedui complained that the Harudes, who recently had been brought across into Gallia, were laying waste to their lands -- not even when they had given hostages had they been able to purchase peace with Ariovistus. Moreover, the Treveri complained that a hundred cantons of the Suebi had set up camps on the banks of the Rhine, and they were attempting to cross the Rhine -- their captains were Nasua and Cimberius, brothers. By these reports Caesar was immensely disturbed and saw fit that he must hasten, lest, if this new band of the Suebi would wish to join together with the older forces of Arivistus, then less easily would Ariovistus be withstood. And so, with grain rations prepared as quickly as able, by the greatest marches he hastened to Ariovistus.


[I.38] When he had advanced for a three days' journey, it was announced to Caesar that Ariovistus  was to seize Vesontio, the greatest town of the Sequani, with all of his forces. Ariovistus was now hastening toward this goal and had advanced a three days' journey from his own territory. Lest this happen, Caesar deemed that he must take the greatest precaution: for of all the necessities which they employed for warfare, the greatest was the opportunity found in that town, given that by the nature of the terrain it was defended such that great would be the opportunity to draw out the war because the Dubis river, as if led about in a circle by a compass, almost girds the entire town -- the remaining space, which is not more than 1,600 feet where the river is interrupted, a mountain of great height encloses it so that the mountain's roots touch on either bank of the river. A wall encircles this  height, making an citadel and links it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by forced night and day marches, and once the town is seized, placeth he there a garrison.

Vesontio, modern-day Besancon. Caesar's description matches the layout beautifully. The Dubis (modern Doubs) River encloses almost the entirety of the circumference of the city apart from the (pictured here) northernmost radian, which is hilly.

[I.39] While he tarried for a few days at Vesontio because of the grain supply and the other sundry preparations for war, due to a persistent questioning by our men and by the chattering of Galli and merchants, who were boasting that the Germani were bodily of enormous size and were of unbelievable valor and training in arms -- often, they said, that when they were with a number of these men gathered, not even their countenance nor also the sharpness of their eyes were they able to bear -- all of a sudden such a great dread seized all the army that not moderately did it set everyone's wits and spirits on edge. This first outset arose amongst the Tribuni Militum, then the Prefecti and the rest who, having Caesar followed out of the City due to friendship, did not have much experience in military stratagem. Of these persons, due to one excuse or another given which he might declare as a necessity for himself to depart, each was asking that he might by Caesar's pleasure be permitted to withdraw. They, influenced by not little shame, were staying on so that the appearance of dread they might avoid -- these men were neither able to put on a good face nor to now and again keep back their tears. Hidden away in their tents, they were either of their orlay complaining or with their peers the common danger bewailing. In common throughout the whole camp were wills being signed. Then because of the chattering of said men and their fear that gradually even those who had great experience about the camp -- the soldiers, the centurions, and the calvary captains -- were becoming upset. Those who were themselves wishing to be less fearful considered, did not fear the enemy, they said -- but the narrowness of the route, and the size of the forests which betwixt themselves and Ariovistus lay, or the grain supply, that it not be able to be conveniently borne on the journey -- these things they feared. Several even to Caesar were reporting that when it came time for him to order the camp struck and the standards advanced, the soldiers would not be disposed to hear his spoken order, nor to bear forth the standards on account of dread.

[I.40] When to these matters he had turned his attention and a council was called together, and with centurions of every rank brought up to him, savagely he laid into them:
First of all, because of what were they thinking that they must question or ponder as to what direction or by what stratagem they were led? That Ariovistus when Caesar was Consul had most desirously sought the Roman People's friendship -- why then would anyone calculate that the man would so rashly back out of his duty? Indeed, Caesar is persuaded that when his demands were understood, and then once the fairness of the terms were seen for what they are, Ariovistus would neither Caesar's nor the Roman People's thanks rebuff. But if because of some rage or madness he should be compelled to declare war, what, pray, did they have to fear in the end? Why did they either of their own valor or of Caesar's own competence lack hope? A trial had been made by a German enemy in the memory of our fathers, when once the Cimbri and Teutones were by C. Marius routed, no less praise did the army seem to win than the conquering general himself deserved. A trial had been made even more recently in Italia, in the slave revolt, yea, even though something of experience and training was offering the slaves some support, which they had from us received. From this, a judgment can be made how much of an advantage steadfastness has, especially since these Germani of whom for some good deal of time while unarmed and without reason our men had been afraid, yet afterwards when the same had been suited for battle and ready to conquer, our men had overcome them. Finally, these were the same Germani with whom often in their number the Helvetii met with not only in their own borders, but also in the Germani' borders, and often the Helvetii have overcome them -- but nevertheless, equal the Helvetii are unable to be with our own army. If the disastrous battle and flight of the Galli should disturb any man, Caesar would say that if they were to investigate the matter, they would be able to discover that because of the long length of the war, the Galli had been exhausted and Ariovistus, when for many moons in his camp he had stayed shut in, yea in his swamps, and not did a go at him did he give them, but then when the Galli did despair of a fight he upon them while scattered did he a-sudden arise, more by wit and stratagem than by valor did he vanquish them. But concerning this stratagem: it had occurred at place against barbarians, and undisciplined ones at that, and by this stratagem not even Ariovistus himself could hope that our armies would be trapped. As for those who might conflate their own fear with some counterfeit concern about the grain supply and the narrowness of the route, then they act presumptuously, since either of the sense of duty of their general did they seem to despair or they appeared to outright object to it. The following to Caesar were a concern: the grain the Sequani, the Leuci, the Lingones were doling out, and that now in the fields there was ripening grain; and of the route? 


-- they would judge it themselves within a short time. But the fact that it has been reported that they would not allow it that they would obey an order nor would they bear forth the standards -- not at all was Caesar upset by this matter. For he was aware that in these sorts of cases in which an army was not obedient to a spoken order, either Fortune then failed them because of ill-management or gluttony had been proved after some other crime is discovered. His own lack of criminal wrongdoing during his life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii had been fully on display. Therefore, Caesar would do at once before the appointed time what he had intended to prepare at a later date; and on the next night at around the fourth watch he would break camp so that as soon as possible he might be able to find out whether shame and duty would win them over or fear. But if none should follow, nevertheless he would go alone with the Tenth Legion, and he had no doubt in regards to this legion, and they would act as his Praetorian Cohort, his Foremost Squadron.

This legion Caesar had been both especially fond and had in them every faith because of their valor.

[I.41] This speech made, in an extraordinary way the minds of all were changed and the highest speed and desire of waging war is born within them, and chief among them the 10th Legion offered thanks to Caesar through the Tribuni Militum, on the grounds given that he had the highest regard toward them, and they confirmed that they were most ready to wage war. Then the remaining legions treated with the Tribuni Militum and the Centuriones of the first ranks so that they might make satisfaction to Caesar, saying they they never doubted him, nor gave in to fear, and they knew that judgment concerning the management of the war was not theirs -- but their general's. Their satisfaction accepted, a route was reconnoitered by Diviciacus -- for out of the Galli, Caesar had in him the greatest faith -- so that he might lead the army in a circuit of more than fifty miles in open terrain; and so, at the fourth watch, just as Caesar had said, he set out. On the seventh day, since he did not break up his march, he was informed by scouts that Ariovistus' forces were four-and-twenty miles from our men.

[I.42] Once Caesar's arrival was learned of, Ariovistus sends envoys to him to say that he allowed for that which Caesar had demanded beforehand, that a parlay take place, since Caesar had come nearer to him and he felt he could do so without danger. And not did Caesar reject these terms, and deemed that the man had returned to sound mind, since he now promised that which he had before denied to Caesar when he sought it; and he was coming into the great hope that, in exchange for so many of his own -- and of the Roman People's -- favors which had been done for him, the man would come around and cease in his stubbornness once he understood Caesar's demands. The day for the conference was announced to be the fifth from that day. In the meantime, while envoys to and fro were sent between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar bring along any infantryman to the conference, for saieth he that he feared lest he be encircled by an ambush; so he would either come with cavalry, or by no other means would he show up. Caesar, since not did he wish for the conference to be cancelled by some last-minute excuse, nor did he durst entrust his own safety to Gallic cavalry, found it most convenient that he take away all horses from Gallic knights and mount thereon the legionnaire soldiery of the 10th Legion, in whom he had the greatest faith. While this order was being carried out, not without humor did one of the soldiers from the 10th Legion speak, saying that Caesar was doing more than what he had vowed, for he swore that in the place of his Praetorian Cohort he would bring along the 10th Legion, but instead he had promoted them to the rank of knight.

[I.43] The plain was large and in it was an earthen mound of sufficient greatness. This place was nearly an equal space from the camp of Ariovistus and Caesar. Thither, as it had been agreed, they came to the conference. Caesar brought the legion, which he had brought along on horses, to a halt within 200 paces of the mound. Likewise the knights of Ariovistus at a similar range halted. Ariovistus demanded that they speak on horseback and that besides themselves they should bring ten men to the conference. When thither they were come, Caesar brought his own and the Senate's favors towards Ariovistus to mind at the outset of his speech, for "King" he had been styled by the Senate, and "Friend" as well, and gifts had been most generously sent. Caesar informed him of how this honor had both been bestowed on few and were accustomed to be granted for great services. But, since neither did he have a Senatorial audience nor a just cause for making demands, Ariovistus had obtained these rewards due to the favor and generosity of Caesar as well as the Senate. He then informed him how ancient and how righteous were the reasons for the relationship linking themselves and the Aedui, what Senatorial decrees -- how many times, how honorific -- had been passed in their favor, so that the Aedui had from all time held the chieftainship of all Gallia, and, even before then, how they had sought our friendship. It was the custom of the Roman People to desire that their allies and friends lose nothing of their own, but should grow in influence, worth, and honor. Who could endure them to be robbed of what they had brought to the friendship of the Roman People? 
Then demanded Caesar the same things which he had given to his envoys as terms, that not upon the Aedui and their allies should Ariovistus declare war, that he should return the hostages, and if no part of the Germans be he able to send back home, then no more should he allow to cross the Rhenus.

[I.44] Ariovistus to the demands of Caesar made a few replies, but concerning his own valor much he proclaimed:
That he himself had crossed the Rhenus not of his own accord, but at the invitation and summons of the Galli, as not without great hope and great rewards had they their home and kinsmen left behind. A place they made in Gallia from those very ones who had yielded it, and their hostages had been by their own free will given. Tribute he seized in accordance with the laws of war, for conquerors have been accustomed to place it upon the conquered. Not he himself upon the Galli, but the Galli did upon him declare war. All the states of Gallia in order to attack him came and against him they set up their encampment. All these forces by him in a single battle were routed and overcome. If again to make an attempt they should wish, then again he was ready to fight it out; if they should wish to sue for peace, then improper would it be to refuse the tribute, which at his own discretion at that time he laid upon them. The friendship of the Roman People was meant to him to be a decoration and a safeguard, it not ought to be a harm, and thus with such a hope he had sought it. If by the whim of Roman People the tribute should be sent back and the vanquished taken from him, with no less pleasure would he refuse the Roman People's friendship which he had once sought. As to the charge that a number of Germani into Gallia he was leading across, he did so for the purpose of defending himself, not to attack Gallia. There was evidence for this assertion, given that if he had not been invited, he would not have come, and that he did not declare war, but defended from it. He had into Gallia come before the Roman People. Never before this time had an army of the Roman People left from the Gallic Province's borders. What did Caesar want of him? Why had he into his possessions come? The province is his, yea this one, this Gallia, just as o'er yonder is ours. As it did not behoove himself if he should unto our territories make an attack, thus likewise we are unjust, for we were him obstructing in his own jurisdiction. As to Caesar saying that the title of "brothers" the Aedui by the Senate were named, not so barbarous was he nor so inexperienced in matters that he did not know that in the last war with the Allobroges, neither had the Aedui to the Romans offered aid, nor had they themselves in those struggles which the Aedui had with himself and the Sequani employed the aid of the Roman People. He ought to be suspicious that Caesar, once a friendship had been feigned, held fast on the grounds that he could in Gallia keep an army for the sake of crushing him. Unless Caesar withdraw and lead his army out of his territories, he would consider him not as a friend, but as an enemy. But if he were to slay him, with many nobles and chief men of the Roman People he would do a favor -- this from they themselves through their messengers he had discovered -- and all of their thanks and friendship due to his death he would be able to purchase. But once Caesar had withdrawn and then the free ownership of Gallia he had to him surrendered, with a great prize he would reward him and each wars he should wish him to be waged, without any toil to him and danger he would bring it to a close.

[I.45] Many things were by Caesar said in the same vein as to why he could not from negotiations back off:
That it was neither in his own or in the custom of the Roman People to endure that their most well-deserved allies they might abandon, nor did he judge that Gallia was rather Ariovistus' than the Roman People's. In war had been vanquished the Arverni and Ruteni by Q. Fabius Maximus, peoples whom the Roman People had pardoned and neither had they into a province reduced them nor had upon them tribute placed. But if every most ancient event he were to take at a glance -- and it would behoove him to -- most righteous was the Roman People's power in Gallia. If he should the judgment of the Senate take a closer look, then free ought to be Gallia, which, though in war defeated, the Senate wished her to be under her own laws.

[I.46] While these things are in the conference being bandied about, to Caesar it is announced that the knights of Ariovistus are nearer to the mound approaching and to our men they are riding up, and stones and weapons at our men are hurling. Caesar made an end of discussion and withdrew to his men and them he ordered not to throw back any weapon whatsoever at the enemy. For though he saw that without any danger to his chosen legion a battle with cavalry shall be, he nevertheless thought that he must not join battle, so that, once the enemy were routed, it could be said that they had been, on the pretense of faith, in conference surrounded. Afterwards it was passed about through the common soldiery what a presumptuous demeanor in the conference Ariovistus had adopted, and that he forbidden the Romans from all of Gallia, and that he had an attack upon our knights made, and how this affair had broken up the conference, so with much greater speed and zeal of fighting more was into the army infused.

[I.47] Two days later, Ariovistus to Caesar sent envoys, saying:
He wished concerning the previous incident, which between them was held, to be begun not completed and to further treat with him and so he asked that either again he a date for a conference set, or, if he should wish that less, he could someone from his own staff to him send.
A reason for holding a conference did not to Caesar seem to be, and more so as the day before the Germani has not been able to be restrained from casting their weapons on our men. An envoy, he was thinking, from his staff he would with great danger send unto Ariovistus and cast him into the midst of savage men. Most convenient it seemed to him to send C. Valerius Procillus, son of C. Valerius Caburus, a youth with the highest valor and education, whose father had been presented with freedom of the state by C. Valerius Flaccus, both on account of his faith and his knowledge of the Gallic tongue, which much now Ariovistus with long use employed, and considering that upon him there would be no reason for offense for Germani, and with him would go M. Metius who had made use of the hospitality of Ariovistus. These commandeth he that they find out what Ariovistus says and bring such a report back to him. When of these men in his presence Ariovistus caught sight, in the presence of his army he shouted: why have they come? To spy on him? When they tried to speak, he stopped them and into bonds cast them.

[I.48] On the same day he moved camp forth and 6 miles from Caesar's camp he pitched at the foot of a height. On the day following that one, beyond Caesar's camp he led his own forces past and two miles further than him he pitched camp, by which stratagem he might from grain and support cut off Caesar, who might by the Sequani and the Aedui be reinforced. From this day for five straight hence, Caesar led before his camp his own forces and in battle array he drew them up, so that, if wisheth Ariovistus to contend in battle, he would not cease from offering a go at him. Ariovistus, within all this time, kept his army within the camp, while in a horseback skirmish daily contended. This was the kind of fighting in which the Germani had trained: for they had 6 thousands on mounts, while as many in number the infantry were most fleet and stout, men whom from all the entire force the knights had one each picked one apiece for the sake of being a bodyguard. With these they in battles accompanied, and to them the knights withdrew. These men, if anything hardier happened, ran alongside; if any had from their mount by a rather serious wound received fallen, these stood about them in defense. If anyone had needs to go forth or to swifter retreat, such was the speed due to their training that, having taken hold of their mane, their horses' gallop they could match.

[I.49] When Caesar understood that Ariovistus was keeping himself in camp, so that he might not from his supply lines might be kept, then beyond that place in which the Germani had set up camp, around 600 paces away from them, a place suitable for camp he chose and, once his army was drawn up in the trifold battle array, he was to that place come. The first and second lines in arms he bade them stand, the third were to defend the camp. This place was from the enemy about 600 paces, as has been said, and there about 16,000 of men -- light-armed -- and with all of his horse Ariovistus sent them forth, for those forces were meant to frighten our men and keep us off from the fortification. No less doth Caesar bid, as he had done beforehand, for the two battle lines to fend off the enemy, the third to complete the work. Once the camp was fortified, two legions there he left behind as well as part of the auxiliaries; four remaining legions he into larger camp led back.

[I.50] The following day, as is his custom, Caesar from out of either camp led his troops and, having set out a bit of a distance from the larger camp, he drew up his battle array and made for the enemy a show of fighting. When he understood that not even then did they did go forth, around noon, he led his army back into the camp. Then finally Ariovistus did part of his forces send so that they might lead an attack upon the smaller camp. Harshly on both sides was it up until evening fought out. At sunset his own forces did Ariovistus lead back to camp with many would inflicted and received. When Caesar sought from prisoners for what reason Ariovistus  did not in battle contest, and he discovered the following reason, that among the Germani there was a certain custom that the women of their tribe would by means of lots and divinations whether battle is to be joined to their advantage or not -- thus they said that it is not the will of the gods for the Germani to overcome if before the new moon they contend in battle.

[I.51] On the day following this, Caesar a garrison did leave behind in either camp, as many as seemed to be enough, and all his auxiliaries in sight of the enemy in front of his smaller camp he halted, for less in the number of his legionary soldiers did his strength seem given the number of the enemy -- thus the auxiliaries he might use for appearance's sake. So Caesar himself, with the legionaries in trifold battle array drawn up, all the way to the enemy's camp approacheth he. Then finally, due to necessity, the Germani led their own forces out of the camp and canton by canton halted at regular intervals: Harudes, Marcomani, Triboci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suebi, and all their own battle line with wagons and carts they surrounded, lest any hope remain in flight. On these their women they placed, who at the passing soldiers pleaded with outspread hands while weeping, lest the men surrender them into slavery to the Romans.

[I.52]  Caesar did place in charge of each legion a single Legatus and a Quaestor, so that as witnesses to his valor each man might consider them -- and so, he himself on the right wing, for towards that part -- the least strong -- of the enemy had turned his thought, joined battle. Thus our men savagely upon the enemy did -- once the signal was given -- make their attack and so the enemy suddenly and quickly broke into a run forward, so that the range for hurling javelins upon the enemy was not given. The javelins tossed aside, hand-to-hand with swords was it fought out. But the Germani quickly according to their custom did a phalanx form and thus the strikes from our swords they blocked. Found were several of our men who upon the phalanx could leap and those shields they would with their bare hands wrench back and downward deliver wounds. When the enemy's battle line was by the left wing routed and into flight had been thrown, and by the right wing were they furiously crushing with a multitude of their own men against our battle line. When to this had P. Crassus turned his mind, he a youth in command of the cavalry, for he had become more disengaged from the fight than those who were amongst the fighting ranks engaged, sendeth he the third battle line to our hard-at-work soldiers as an assist.

[I.53] Thus the battle was renewed, and the enemy turned their backs and not did they stop from fleeing before they thither to the Rhenus many miles from that place -- around 50 -- they arrived. There, very few were either trusting enough of their own strength to struggle to swim across, or with the rafts they found did they safety seek. Among these was Ariovistus, who, when a little ship lashed to the riverbank he obtained, fled forth on it. Once the rest of the men were overtaken, our Knights slew them. Two were the wives of Ariovistus, one of the Suebi nation, whom from home he had led our with himself; and the other was Norican, King Voccio's sister, whom he had wed in Gallia and by her brother she had been sent -- both in the flight died. Two were the daughters: of these, one was slain, the other taken. C. Valerius Procillus, whilst he was by his guards in their flight dragged along and bound in threefold manacles, into Caesar's own hands did he fall as Caesar chased down the enemy with his cavalry. Indeed, this did to Caesar bore delight no less than the victory herself, for the man was the most honest of all of the province of Gallia, Caesar's own dear friend and house-guest, whom he now knew to be snatched from the clutches of the enemy and restored to him, and not by a tragedy regarding him had fortune lessened any of delight and joy. And the man said that in his presence trice had the lots been consulted concerning his fate, whether by fire he might at once be burnt or for another time kept alive -- the lots' goodwill spake that he be unharmed. Likewise was M. Metius recovered and led back to Caesar.

[I.54] This battle was across the Rhenus announced, and the Suebi, who had to the banks of the Rhenus come, began to turn back home. When the Ubii, who dwell nearest to the Rhenus, did realize that those men were in a state of panic, they fell upon a great number of them and felled them. Caesar in one summer with two very great wars completed, he a little sooner than the season of the year demanded, wintered his army among the Sequani. During the winter, he did put Labienus in command. Caesar himself into Hither-Gallia to hold official court set out.

-END OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS THE GERMAN-

C. IVLI CAESARIS COMMENTARII DE BELLO GALLICO LIBER II - Caesar's Commentaries on The Gallic War Book II